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Abstract 
This article explores the effects of the political reactions to the 2007-9 Financial 
Crisis on the monetary system. It chimes in with the view that shadow banks 
create ‘shadow money’, i.e. private substitutes for bank deposits. The article 
analyses how the three main forms of shadow money—money market fund 
shares, overnight repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial 
papers—were affected by the short-term government intervention and medium-
term regulation during and after the 2007-9 Financial Crisis in the United States. 
The analysis reveals that the measures taken between 2007 and 2014 integrated 
some shadow money forms in the public money supply. In the year after the 
Lehman collapse, the initially private shadow money supply was either publicly 
backstopped or de-monetised as it had broken par to bank deposits. The public 
backstops took on the form of emergency facilities established by the Federal 
Reserve and guarantees proclaimed by the Treasury. Those backstops imply that 
the public institutional framework to protect bank deposits was extended to 
some forms of shadow money during the crisis. This tendency has continued in 
post-crisis regulation. Accordingly, the 2007-9 Financial Crisis has triggered a 
paradigmatic change in the monetary system, attributable to the political 
decisions of U.S. authorities. 
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1.	Introduction	
	
It	has	become	an	established	notion	in	International	Political	Economy	(IPE)	that	
shadow	banking	played	a	key	role	in	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis.	The	centrality	of	
the	 shadow	 banking	 system	 in	 the	 crisis	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 significant	 body	 of	
scholarship	 that	 investigates	 the	 evolution,	 characteristics	 and	 implications	 of	
shadow	 banking	 for	 the	 global	 financial	 system	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Lysandrou	 and	
Nesvetailova	2014,	Thiemann	2014,	Nesvetailova	2015,	Ban	et	al.	2016,	Bryan	et	
al.	2016,	Gabor	2016	and	Helgadóttir	2016).	
	
In	 the	 fields	of	 economics,	 finance	and	 law,	 the	 financial	 crisis	has	 led	a	
range	 of	 commentators	 to	 theorize	 that	 shadow	bank	 liabilities	 are	more	 than	
just	 financial	 assets	 but	 ‘shadow	 money’,	 i.e.	 money	 substitutes	 or—more	
precisely—substitutes	for	commercial	bank	deposits.	The	rationale	is	as	follows:	
If	 banks	 create	deposits	 as	money	 and	 if	 shadow	banking	 is	 the	 contemporary	
version	of	banking	in	an	unregulated	realm,	then	shadow	banks	must	be	creators	
of	something	that	 is	money	in	a	 functional	sense	(see	e.g.	Pozsar	2014).	Within	
this	 line	 of	 thinking,	 the	 events	 ranging	 from	 the	 near-failure	 of	 Countrywide	
Securities	 to	 the	 collapses	 of	 Bear	 Stearns	 and	 Lehman	 Brothers	 have	
convincingly	been	described	as	runs	on	the	shadow	banking	system	(cf.	Gorton	
2010,	Mehrling	2011).	As	 the	runs	 took	place	on	 the	wholesale	money	market,	
they	 were	 not	 as	 visible	 as	 classic	 runs	 on	 deposit-issuing	 commercial	 banks,	
with	 long	queues	of	depositors	 lining	up	 in	 front	of	bank	branches.	Other	 than	
that,	 however,	 there	 were	 barely	 any	 functional	 differences	 to	 previous	 bank	
runs.	
	
The	shadow	money	literature	has	produced	innovative	insights	about	the	
implications	of	shadow	bank	liabilities	for	the	monetary	system	and	the	financial	
crisis.	 However,	 it	 has	 a	 blind	 spot	 regarding	 the	 politics	 involved.	 It	 does	 not	
provide	a	clear	analysis	of	 the	role	 that	political	measures	played	 in	saving	 the	
shadow	money	supply	during	the	crisis	and	re-designing	it	afterwards.	While	we	
know	 about	 individual	 bail-outs	 and	 regulations,	 we	 neither	 have	 a	 coherent	
picture	of	their	combined	effect	on	the	setup	of	the	money	supply	in	general	nor	
a	 theoretically	 grounded	 explanation	 of	 the	 institutional	 changes	 they	 brought	
about.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 we	 lack	 a	 systematic	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 political	
interventions	 to	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis,	 combined	 with	 the	 post-crisis	
regulatory	reforms,	have	affected	the	monetary	system.		
	
IPE	 is	 the	 field	 uniquely	 well	 equipped	 to	 provide	 an	 answer	 to	 this	
question.	 Still,	 the	 IPE	 literature	 on	 shadow	 banking	 has	 barely	 acknowledged	
the	 theoretical	 perpective	 that	 shadow	 banking	 is	 a	 monetary	 phenomenon.	
Hence,	whilst	IPE	has	extensively	looked	at	the	politics	of	shadow	banking,	it	has	
not	addressed	its	implications	for	the	monetary	system	(see	Helgadóttir	2016	for	
an	overview	on	the	current	IPE	discourse	on	shadow	banking).	This	article	sets	
out	 to	 fill	 this	 gap.	 It	 studies	 how	 the	 political	 measures	 during	 and	 after	 the	
2007-9	Financial	Crisis	have	affected	 the	 scope	of	public	 control	over	different	
forms	of	credit	money	and	what	the	status	of	shadow	money	is	in	the	post-crisis	
environment.	The	article	thus	looks	at	the	U.S.	as	the	centre	of	the	international	
monetary	and	financial	system	and	presents	an	analysis	of	the	three	main	forms	
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of	 deposit	 substitutes	 created	 by	 shadow	 banks:	 asset-backed	 commercial	
papers	(ABCPs),	overnight	repurchase	agreements	(overnight	repos)	and	money	
market	fund	shares	(MMF	shares)	(Ricks	2011)—financial	instruments	that	were	
partly	 included	 in	 the	 broad	monetary	 aggregate	M3,	which	 the	 Fed	 ironically	
stopped	 measuring	 and	 publishing	 in	 2006	 for	 perceived	 lack	 of	 relevance	
(Gorton	 2010:	 176).	 The	 article	 then	 spells	 out	 how	 the	 measures	 of	 the	 U.S.	
Treasury,	 the	 Fed	 and	 various	 regulatory	 agencies—over	 time	 and	 across	
different	 market	 segments	 of	 shadow	 banking—have	 altered	 the	 setup	 of	 the	
publicly	controlled	money	supply.	
	
The	 empirical	 analysis—based	 on	 publications	 of	 financial	 institutions,	
articles	 in	 the	 financial	 press,	 autobiographies,	 seven	 expert	 interviews,	 and	
secondary	 literature—reveals	 that	 the	 public	 institutional	 framework	 that	 had	
been	 created	 to	 prevent	 panics	 in	 the	 market	 for	 bank	 deposits	 has	 been	
extended	 towards	 different	 shadow	 banking	 liabilities,	 thus	 reinforcing	 their	
status	as	shadow	money	during	the	crisis.	In	the	year	after	the	Lehman	collapse,	
public	 authorities	 have	 assumed	 responsibility	 to	 guarantee	 par	 clearance	 for	
overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares.	Still,	the	introduction	of	public	measures	that	
have	cemented	the	status	of	shadow	banking	liabilities	as	shadow	money	is	not	
uniform,	as	ABCPs	ceased	to	function	as	deposit	substitutes	when	authorities	let	
them	break	away	 from	par.	This	divergent	 tendency	has	continued	 in	 the	post-
crisis	 regulatory	 process:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 regulators	made	ABCPs	 and	 Prime	
MMF	shares	lose	their	status	as	shadow	money	for	good.	For	overnight	repos	and	
Government	MMF	shares,	in	contrast,	new	regulations	strengthen	their	promise	
to	 trade	 at	 par	 to	 deposits	 and	 the	 emergency	 backstops	 remain	 implicitly	 in	
place.	 In	 addition,	 due	 to	 an	 innovative	 explicit	 public	 backstop	 for	 the	 repo	
market	 (via	 the	 so-called	 Reverse	 Repo	 Facility),	 the	 Fed	 has	 become	 a	
permanent	Dealer	of	Last	Resort	(cf.	Mehrling	2011).	
	
Besides	detailing	the	extent	to	which	the	public	interventions	during	and	
after	 the	 crisis	 have	 affected	 the	 role	 of	 shadow	 money	 within	 the	 monetary	
system,	the	analysis	contributes	towards	understanding	the	origins	and	causes	of	
these	changes.	The	findings	suggest	a	functionalist	view	on	the	role	of	politics	in	
the	 institutional	 transformation	of	 the	monetary	and	 financial	system:	The	role	
acquired	 by	 shadow	 banking	 liabilities	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 characteristics	 as	
deposit	substitutes	and	the	endogenous	dynamics	of	the	run	on	shadow	banking	
have	influenced	the	nature	of	the	public	intervention.	Policy-makers	first	sought	
to	attain	market-based	 solutions	and	 tried	 to	 remain	within	 their	 conventional	
logic	 by	 granting	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 support	 only	 to	 deposit-issuing	 banks.	
Only	 when	 this	 approach	 proved	 insufficient,	 they	 decided	 to	 step	 in	 more	
forcefully	 and	 directly	 backstop	 institutions	 issuing	 shadow	money.	While	 the	
exercise	 of	 political	 power	 was	massive	 and	 paradigm-changing,	 the	 direction	
was	 guided	 by	 the	 incidental	 unfolding	 of	 the	 crisis.	 The	 emergency	 crisis	
management	 pre-determined	 the	 trajectory	 for	 the	 purposeful	 institution	
building	 after	 the	 crisis	 as	 it	 created	 a	 path	 dependency	 for	 the	 continuous	
backstopping	of	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos.	
	
The	remainder	of	the	article	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	reviews	the	
literature	that	connects	shadow	banking	with	money	creation	and	explains	how	
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shadow	 money	 creation	 worked	 in	 the	 pre-crisis	 shadow	 banking	 system.	 It	
introduces	 the	 ‘Money	 Matrix’	 as	 an	 analytical	 tool	 to	 grasp	 the	 hybridity	
between	 public	 and	 private	 credit	 money	 and	 to	 conceptualise	 the	 realm	 of	
public	control	over	the	money	supply.	It	shows	that	prior	to	the	2007-9	Financial	
Crisis,	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	corresponded	to	the	category	of	
private	 credit	 money	 as	 they	 were	 located	 outside	 of	 the	 publicly	 protected	
monetary	 system.	 Section	 3	 studies	 each	 of	 the	 three	market	 segments	 in	 the	
shadow	 banking	 system	 to	 understand	 and	 explain	 how	 political	 measures	
affected	 them	during	 the	 three	waves	 of	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis.	 Section	 4	
analyses	 how	 U.S.	 regulatory	 agencies	 have	 pushed	 on	 those	 shifts	 in	 the	
regulatory	process	since	2009.	Section	5	concludes.	 	
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2.	Shadow	money	creation	in	the	shadow	banking	system	before	2007	
	
The	 term	 ‘shadow	 banking’	 has	 been	 coined	 by	 Paul	 McCulley	 in	 a	 speech	 at	
Jackson	Hole	in	2007	to	provide	an	analytical	account	of	the	financial	structures	
which,	 at	 that	 point,	 were	 at	 the	 brink	 of	 collapsing	 (cf.	 McCulley	 2009).	
According	 to	 the	authoritative	definition	of	 the	Financial	 Stability	Board	 (FSB),	
shadow	banking	is	to	be	understood	as	‘credit	intermediation	involving	entities	
and	 activities	 outside	 the	 regular	 banking	 system’	 (FSB	 2011:	 1).	 Pozsar	 et	 al.	
(2012),	 in	 a	 paper	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Fed,	 argue	 that	 the	 shadow	 banking	
system—on	 different	 connected	 balance	 sheets	 ‘through	 a	 daisy-chain	 of	 non-
bank	 financial	 intermediaries	 in	 a	multi	 step	 process’	 (ibid:	 10)—does	what	 a	
classic	 commercial	 bank	 did	 on	 its	 own	 singular	 balance	 sheet.	 In	 this,	 the	
dominant	view	in	the	IPE	literature	suggests	that	the	origin	of	shadow	banking	is	
best	to	be	explained	by	regulatory	arbitrage	(cf.	Nesvetailova	2015)	as	well	as	tax	
and	credit	rating	arbitrage	(Bryan	et	al.	2016).	
	
This	dominant	view	treats	shadow	banking	essentially	as	a	non-monetary	
phenomenon.	However,	a	small	but	growing	literature—coming	mainly	from	an	
economics,	finance	and	law	context—suggests	that	shadow	banking	is	inherently	
connected	with	new	forms	of	money	creation.	To	understand	these	antagonistic	
viewpoints,	it	helps	to	contrast	two	theoretical	approaches	towards	‘traditional’	
commercial	banking.	The	first	denies	that	banks	are	capable	of	creating	money	in	
the	 form	 of	 deposits	 at	 their	 own	 discretion.	 In	 this	 logic,	 banks	 are	 either	
conceptualised	as	intermediaries	that	distribute	pre-existing	money	or,	following	
the	money	multiplier	model,	create	money	induced	by	central	banks.	The	second	
approach	 affirms	 that	 banks	 are	 in	 the	 position	 to	 autonomously	 issue	 credit	
money.	 Accordingly,	 banks	 are	 able	 to	 issue	 deposits	 at	 their	 own	 discretion:	
They	 create	money	out	of	nothing	by	 swapping	debt	 claims	 (IOUs)	of	different	
maturities	(cf.	e.g.	Werner	2015).	The	latter	view	had	been	largely	marginalised	
in	economic	 thinking	during	 the	 time	of	 the	Great	Moderation	but	 recently	has	
become	more	widely	 accepted.	 In	 2014,	 for	 example,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 has	
brought	this	view	to	the	awareness	of	the	mainstream	policy	discourse	(McLeay	
et	 al.	 2014).	 As	 Jakab	 and	 Kumhof	 (2015)	 emphasize,	 it	 makes	 a	 crucial	
difference	 if	 we	 think	 of	 traditional	 banks	 as	 mere	 intermediaries	 of	 existing	
loanable	funds	or	as	actual	creators	of	money.		
	
Hence,	 if	we	acknowledge	 that	 traditional	banking	 involves	autonomous	
money	creation	by	banks	and	translate	this	new	economic	thinking	about	money	
to	shadow	banking,	the	mere	continuation	of	traditional	banking	by	other	means,	
we	 arrive	 at	 the	 analytical	 position	 that	 shadow	 banking	 has	 to	 go	 along	with	
money	creation	as	well.	The	idea	of	shadow	banking	as	a	monetary	phenomenon	
has	explicitly	been	introduced	and	fleshed	out	in	Pozsar	(2014),	but	also	plays	a	
role	 in	 Pozsar	 (2011,	 2015).	 This	 notion	 is	 well	 rooted	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Perry	
Mehrling	 (see	Mehrling	 2011,	 2013a,	 2013b,	 2015a	 and	Mehrling	 et	 al.	 2013),	
whose	 ‘Money	 View’—coming	 from	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	 money	 tradition	
(Schumpeter	 1954:	 686)—offers	 a	 conceptual	 lens	 to	 regard	 shadow	 banking	
liabilities	as	a	form	of	credit	money.	Likewise,	Ricks	(2011)	presents	a	thorough	
argument	for	why	the	 liabilities	of	shadow	banks	are	functionally	equivalent	to	
bank	 deposits	 (also	 see	 Ricks	 2012	 and	 2016).	 While	 this	 idea	 was	 further	
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developed	by	numerous	authors	in	recent	years	(Claessens	et	al.	2014,	McMillan	
2014,	 Moe	 2012,	 2014,	 Turner	 2012),	 the	 latest	 contribution	 aiming	 at	
establishing	 a	 broader	 theory	 of	 shadow	 money	 comes	 from	 Gabor	 and	
Vestergaard	(2016).	Adrian	(2014),	in	his	literature	review	on	the	economics	of	
shadow	 banking,	 identifies	 private	 money	 creation	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	 features	
attributed	to	shadow	banking	and	points	to	Gorton	and	Metrick	(2012),	Moreira	
and	 Savov	 (2012)	 as	 well	 as	 Sunderam	 (2012)	 as	 the	 most	 relevant	 papers	
stressing	this	point.	Gorton	(2010)	explicitly	analyses	the	quality	of	repurchase	
agreements	 as	 a	 substitute	 to	 bank	 deposits	 and	 was	 the	 first	 to	 deliver	 the	
interpretation	that	the	Financial	Crisis	in	its	essence	was	a	‘run	on	repo’.	
	
This	 argument	 about	 the	 monetary	 characteristics	 of	 shadow	 banking	
liabilities	has	been	made	with	regard	to	ABCPs,	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos	
(Ricks	 2011).	 Figure	 1—based	 on	 Claessens	 et	 al.	 (2012)—demonstrates	 how	
these	 shadow	 money	 forms	 were	 issued	 before	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis	
within	 the	 ‘daisy	 chain’	 of	 shadow	 banking.	 They	 are	 high-quality,	 short-term	
debt	instruments	created	by	different	non-bank	financial	institutions	that	in	this	
regard	 function	 as	 shadow	 banks:	 ABCPs	 are	 the	 liabilities	 of	 Special	 Purpose	
Vehicles	(SPVs)1—entities	typically	set	up	by	large	commercial	banks,	which	use	
them	 as	 off-balance-sheet	 institutions	 to	 conduct	 banking	 functions	 while	
circumventing	capital	requirements	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	6-7).	Overnight	repos	are	
private	 debt	 instruments	 constructed	 around	 the	 sale	 and	 repurchase	 of	
securities.	The	repo	market	is	run	by	Securities	Dealers	who—as	they	are	willing	
to	buy	and	sell	 repos	at	different	prices	and	maturities—act	as	market	makers	
(Mehrling	2013b,	2013c).	MMF	shares	are	the	liabilities	of	Money	Market	Funds,	
which	 pool	 the	 funds	 of	 households	 and	 institutional	 investors	 on	 the	 retail	
money	market	to	invest	them	in	the	shadow	banking	system.	Government	MMFs	
invest	 at	 least	 99.5%	 of	 their	 assets	 into	 cash,	 government	 securities	 or	 fully	
collateralized	 repos;	 Prime	 MMFs	 buy	 predominantly	 private	 debt	 (ICI	 2014:	
196).	 The	 three	 shadow	money	 forms	 are	 produced	 via	 two	main	 channels	 of	
shadow	 banking	 (cf.	 McMillan	 2014:	 65-79):	 that	 of	 security	 intermediation	
(repo	 channel)	 and	 that	of	 securitisation	via	 structured	assets	 (ABCP	channel).	
MMFs	 connect	 both	 these	 channels	 with	 the	 ultimate	 savers,	 i.e.	 institutional	
investors	and,	to	a	much	lesser	extent,	households.	Taken	together,	this	market-
based	credit	system	conducts	‘money	market	funding	of	capital	market	lending’	
(Mehrling	et	al.	2013:	2).	
	
FIGURE	1:	Shadow	money	creation	in	the	stylised	shadow	banking	system	
	
Why	 are	 ABCPs,	 MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos	 considered	 shadow	
money	 by	 proponents	 of	 a	 monetary	 view	 on	 shadow	 banking?	 The	 core	
argument	 in	 the	 shadow	money	 literature	 is	 that,	 despite	 different	 regulatory	
treatment,	 shadow	money	 forms	 are	 similar	 to	 bank	 deposits	 in	 three	 crucial	
respects:	
	
First,	 from	 a	 supply	 side	 perspective,	 both	 deposits	 and	 shadow	money	
are	 short-term	 debt	 instruments	 issued	 on	 the	 balance	 sheets	 of	 financial	
institutions	(cf.	Figure	2).	The	balance	sheet	mechanics	involved	have	structural	
parallels	as	the	issuance	of	both	deposits	and	shadow	money	involves	swapping	
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IOUs	 of	 different	 maturities	 (Mehrling	 2015a).	 Following	 a	 credit	 theory	 of	
money	logic,	this	balance	sheet	operation	lies	at	the	heart	of	money	creation	(cf.	
Minsky	 1986).	 In	 the	 traditional	 banking	 system,	 deposits	 are	 created	 as	
commercial	 banks’	 short-term	 liabilities	 when	 the	 bank	 issues	 a	 loan	 or	 buys	
bonds	as	a	 long-term	IOU	and	credits	 its	customer’s	account	with	deposits	as	a	
short-term	IOU.	In	the	shadow	banking	system,	SPVs	swap	ABCPs	as	short-term	
IOUs	 against	 ABSs	 as	 longer-term	 IOUs	 (Acharya	 et	 al.	 2010:	 1).	 Securities	
dealers	 swap	 overnight	 repos—i.e.	 repos	 of	 the	 shortest	 possible	 maturity—
against	 term	 repos	 with	 longer	 maturities.	 Viewing	 repos	 as	 shadow	 money	
requires	 shifting	 the	 focus	 away	 from	 the	 exchange	 of	 collateral	 and	 focusing	
instead	on	the	issuance	of	the	repo	certificate	as	an	IOU.	The	collateral	exchange	
in	the	repo	transaction	is	then	merely	a	byproduct	of	credit	creation.	MMFs	swap	
their	 shares	 with	 instantaneous	 maturity	 against	 ABCPs	 in	 the	 securitisation	
channel	 or	 repos	 in	 the	 collateral	 intermediation	 channel,	 which	 have	 still	
slightly	longer	maturities	(cf.	Jackson	2013:	379).	
	
FIGURE	2:	Traditional	and	shadow	money,	created	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	
	
Second,	 from	 a	 demand	 side	 perspective,	 both	 deposits	 and	 shadow	
money	are	held	by	agents	who	consider	them	‘cash’,	 i.e.	the	most	liquid	form	of	
an	 asset	 capable	 of	 doing	 immediate	 purchases	 of	 commodities	 or	 financial	
assets	(Pozsar	2014).	Deposits	and	MMF	shares	are	deposited	on	their	respective	
accounts	 and	 can	 typically	 be	 withdrawn	 instantaneously.	 For	 ABCPs	 and	
overnight	repos,	the	mechanism	works	differently	but	is	functionally	equivalent:	
They	 remain	 ‘deposited’	 if	 investors	 roll	 them	 over	 after	 maturity,	 and	 are	
‘withdrawn’	 if	 the	 contract	 is	 not	 renewed.	 While	 overnight	 repos	 have	 a	
maturity	 of	 one	 day	 by	 definition,	 the	 majority	 of	 ABCPs	 issued	 in	 2007	 had	
maturities	of	one	to	four	days	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).	Historically,	shadow	money	
has	 been	 purposefully	 developed	 to	 provide	 deposit	 alternatives.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	 all	 three	 shadow	 money	 forms	 were	 tailored	 to	 attract	 institutional	
investors	as	they	promised	security	for	cash	holdings	above	the	ceiling	of	deposit	
protection	 (cf.	 Jackson	 2013:	 379).	 According	 to	 Pozsar	 (2015:	 29),	 ‘[f]or	
institutional	 cash	 pools,	 money	 begins	 where	 M2	 ends’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 MMF	
shares	and	ABCPs,	being	a	deposit	alternative	for	institutional	investors	was	an	
idea	 more	 or	 less	 present	 from	 the	 start.	 Repos,	 a	 historically	 much	 older	
financial	instrument,	developed	into	shadow	money	with	the	rise	of	the	tri-party	
repo	 market	 in	 the	 1970s	 (cf.	 Garbade	 2006:	 38-39;	 Jones	 1997:	 28).	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 MMF	 shares	 were	 also	 designed	 for	 retail	 customers	 by	 offering	
higher	interest	rates	than	commercial	bank	deposits.	MMFs	could	circumvent	the	
cap	 of	 interest	 rates	 paid	 on	 bank	 deposits	 due	 to	 ‘Regulation	Q’.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	 to	 provide	 the	 same	 comforts	 as	 bank	 accounts,	 MMFs	 introduced	 cash	
management	 options	 such	 as	 check	writing,	 credit	 and	 debit	 cards	 (Baklanova	
2012:	98).	
	
Third,	both	bank	deposits	and	shadow	money	are	promises	to	pay	higher-
ranking	money	 to	which	 they	 trade	 at	 par	 or	 quasi-par	 and	 in	which	 they	 are	
instantaneously	 or	 almost	 instantaneously	 convertible.	 In	 the	 contemporary	
financial	 system,	 those	 hierarchically	 higher	 forms	 of	 money	 are	 central	 bank	
liabilities	 for	 deposits,	 and	 deposits	 for	 shadow	 money	 (cf.	 Mehrling	 2011).	
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However,	 while	 par	 exchange	 between	 deposits	 and	 central	 bank	 liabilities	 is	
politically	 induced	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 discount	window	 and	 the	 Federal	
Deposit	 Insurance	Company	 (FDIC),	par	exchange	between	shadow	money	and	
deposits	 as	 of	 2007	 relied	 on	 market	 mechanisms	 and	 private	 guarantees.	
Accordingly,	 before	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 ABCP	 issuance	 was	 based	 on	
‘securitization	without	risk	transfer’	(Acharya	et	al.	2010),	which	implies	that	the	
sponsors	had	to	‘pay	off	maturing	ABCP	at	par	independently	of	underlying	asset	
values’	(Acharya	and	Schnabl	2010:	40).	Investors	therefore	expected	‘to	be	able	
to	access	their	 funds	on	demand	at	par	value’	(Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).	Overnight	
repos	had	such	a	short	maturity	that	their	price	fluctuations	were	negligible	and	
made	 them	 trade	 at	 quasi-par	 to	 deposits	 (Ricks	 2011:	 79).	 In	 addition,	 Gabor	
and	Vestergaard	(2016:	2,	22)	note	that	the	use	of	collateral	in	repo	transactions	
enhances	the	promise	to	pay	par,	and	that	mark-to-market	practices	of	collateral	
portfolios	help	maintain	par	also	for	repos	with	maturity	longer	than	overnight.	
And	for	MMFs,	the	promise	to	maintain	a	one	dollar	per	share	net	asset	value	lay	
at	 the	 core	 of	 their	 business	 model	 (Fink	 2011:	 253).	 Investors	 buying	 MMF	
shares	were	guaranteed	to	be	paid	back	‘one	buck	on	the	dollar’.	In	many	cases,	
MMFs’	parent	institutions	gave	implicit	guarantees	to	prevent	breaking	the	buck	
(Jackson	2013:	379).	
	
In	 sum,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 this	 literature,	 the	 liabilities	 of	 shadow	
banks	are	to	be	regarded	as	forms	of	private	credit	money	that	co-exists	next	to	
publicly	 provided	 forms	 of	money.	 This	 ‘hybridity’	 of	 public	 and	private	 credit	
money	is	perceived	as	a	fundamental	property	of	modern	monetary	systems	(see	
Ingham	 2004,	 Mehrling	 2015a):	 In	 absence	 of	 commodity	 money,	 all	 money	
forms	 today	 are	 essentially	 tradable	 debt	 claims	 issued	 either	 by	 public	
institutions,	notably	the	central	bank,	or	private	institutions	such	as	commercial	
banks	and	shadow	banks.	The	fact	that	public	and	private	money	forms	trade	at	
par	with	 each	 other	 in	 normal	 times	makes	 them	 appear	 similar	 and	 conceals	
inherent	differences,	especially	as	 they	are	all	denominated	 in	 the	same	unit	of	
account	 (Mehrling	 2011,	 2013b,	 2015a).	 To	 make	 the	 hybridity	 of	 public	 and	
private	 credit	money	 explicit,	 Pozsar	 (2014)	 develops	 the	 ‘Money	Matrix’	 as	 a	
heuristic	 tool,	 which	 offers	 a	 taxonomy	 to	 sketch	 how	 publicly	 and	 privately	
created	forms	of	money	are	intervowen	(see	Figure	3).	
	
FIGURE	3:	The	‘Money	Matrix’	(conceptually)	
	
The	Money	Matrix	also	allows	to	develop	a	clearer	notion	of	the	role	that	
public	 authorities	 play	 in	 controlling	 the	 money	 supply.	 Public	 control	 is	
understood	here	as	 the	state	assuming	responsibility	 to	guarantee	 that	a	given	
credit	money	form	clears	at	par	vis-à-vis	higher-ranking	money	forms	or—in	the	
case	 of	 the	 top	 credit	money	 form—to	 the	 unit	 of	 account	 (see	Mitchell-Innes	
1914	 for	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	unit	 of	 account	 as	 an	 abstract	 idea	 to	which	
actual	 debt	 instruments	 correspond).	 In	 line	 with	 Pozsar	 (2014:	 15),	 the	 left	
column	 in	 the	Money	Matrix	 displays	 two	 different	 categories	 of	 ‘public	 credit	
money’	for	which	public	authorities	assume	such	responsibility.	The	money-like	
liabilities	of	a	public	 institution,	 typically	a	modern-type	central	bank,	are	pure	
public	money.	 Here,	 public	 authorities	 directly	 guarantee	 par	 by	 issuing	 credit	
money	 themselves.	 The	 money-like	 liabilities	 of	 private	 institutions	 that	 have	
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public	backstops	and	can	tap	public	institutions’	balance	sheets	via	the	discount	
window	 or	 insurance	 schemes	 are	 private-public	 money.	 In	 this	 case,	 public	
authorities	 guarantee	 par	 clearance	 indirectly	 through	 a	 public-private	
partnership	 for	 credit	money	creation.	The	right	 column	displays	 two	different	
categories	 of	 ‘private	 credit	 money’:	 The	 money-like	 liabilities	 of	 private	
institutions	 that	do	not	have	access	 to	backstops	on	a	public	balance	sheet	are	
public-private	money	 if	 issued	against	public	assets,	and	purely	private	money	 if	
issued	 against	 private	 assets.	 For	 private	 credit	 money,	 par	 clearance	 is	 only	
sustained	by	market	 forces	and	private	guarantors	but	not	 the	 state.	Together,	
public	and	private	credit	money	forms	constitute	the	general	money	supply.		
	
Figure	4—following	 Pozsar	 (2014:	 13-16)—presents	 an	 empirical	
account	 of	 the	Money	Matrix	 for	 the	U.S.	monetary	 system	at	 the	outset	 of	 the	
2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis—both	with	 regard	 to	 the	 ‘traditional’	 and	 the	 ‘shadow	
money’	supply.2	Thus,	in	the	realm	of	public	credit	money,	purely	public	money	is	
issued	by	the	Federal	Reserve	in	the	form	of	currency	and	central	bank	deposits.	
While	currency	is	available	to	all	economic	actors,	central	bank	deposits	can	only	
be	held	by	commercial	banks.	Both	form	what	is	conventionally	referred	to	as	the	
‘monetary	base’	or	the	monetary	aggregate	M0.	Private-public	money	is	made	up	
of	 insured	bank	deposits,	based	on	 the	 insurance	 limit	of	 the	FDIC	which	as	of	
2007	had	been	 capped	at	 $100,000.	According	 to	 the	Fed’s	definition,	 they	 fall	
under	the	aggregates	M1	and	M2.	Shadow	money	forms,	in	contrast,	are	part	of	
the	 private	 credit	 money	 realm.	 Public-private	 money	 was	 made	 up	 of	 MMF	
shares	and	overnight	repos	in	so	far	as	they	are	issued	against	public	debt,	which	
is	 true	 for	 Government	MMFs	 and	 the	 government	 desk	 of	 Securities	 Dealers.	
Forms	of	purely	private	money	 are	ABCPs,	overnight	 repos	 issued	by	Securities	
Dealers’	credit	desk,	shares	of	Prime	MMFs	as	well	as	uninsured	bank	deposits.	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 monetary	 aggregates,	 retail	 MMF	 shares	 are	 part	 of	 M2	 and	
overnight	repos	were	included	in	M3,	which	the	Fed	ceased	to	measure	in	2006	
but	is	still	used	e.g.	by	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	(cf.	Gorton	2010:	176-
177,	Ricks	2016:	39).	
	
FIGURE	4:	The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	before	the	2007-9	Crisis)	
	
The	 literature	 that	regards	shadow	banking	as	a	monetary	phenomenon	
adds	 an	additional	dimension	 to	our	understanding	of	 the	 role	 and	 function	of	
shadow	banks	(see	e.g.	Ricks	2011),	helps	systematically	integrate	shadow	bank	
liabilities	into	analyses	of	the	monetary	system	(cf.	Pozsar	2014	and	the	Money	
Matrix),	 and	 offers	 a	 convincing	 narrative	 of	 the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis	 as	 a	
systemic	 run	 on	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system	 (cf.	 Gorton	 2010).	 However,	 this	
literature	 has	 not	 developed	 a	 systematic	 account	 of	 the	 role	 that	 politics	 has	
played	 in	 saving	 and	 re-designing	 the	 shadow	money	 supply	 during	 the	 crisis	
and	 in	post-crisis	 regulation.	 Since	2008	numerous	policy	measures	have	been	
undertaken	by	public	authorities	 in	 the	U.S.	and	other	key	 jurisdictions	to	 limit	
the	spill-overs	of	the	run	on	the	shadow	banking	system,	as	well	as	to	extend	the	
scope	of	regulatory	oversight	to	cover	these	previously	unregulated	activities.	It	
remains	to	be	understood	to	which	extent	the	extensive	public	 interventions	in	
response	to	the	crisis	have	altered	the	status	of	ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	
shares	within	the	monetary	system’s	hybrid	structure.	 	
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This	article	addresses	 this	gap:	 It	adopts	 the	monetary	angle	on	shadow	
banking	and	then	traces	the	way	in	which	the	interventions	of	U.S.	authorities—
primarily	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	U.S.	Treasury	and	the	Securities	and	Exchange	
Commission	 (SEC)—have	 affected	 the	 shadow	money	 supply	 during	 and	 after	
the	 2007-9	 Financial	 Crisis.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 the	
interventions	of	policy-makers	during	the	crisis	have	extended	public	control	on	
overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares	 whilst	 letting	 ABCPs	 break	 par	 to	 bank	
deposits.	 The	 following	 section	 will	 show	 that	 two	 divergent	 processes	 have	
been	taking	place	during	post-crisis	regulation	which	broadly	followed	the	path	
trodden	by	the	emergency	crisis	intervention.	
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3.	How	did	the	Political	Interventions	of	Public	Authorities	during	the	
2007-9	Crisis	Affect	Shadow	Money?	
	
The	run	on	shadow	banking	during	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	occurred	in	three	
waves:	The	first	was	associated	with	the	near-failure	of	Countrywide	Securities	
in	August	2007,	 the	second	with	the	shutdown	and	takeover	of	Bear	Stearns	 in	
March	 2008,	 and	 the	 third	 with	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers	 in	
September	 2008	 (Mehrling	 2011:	 119-121).	 As	 in	 previous	 bank	 runs,	 public	
authorities	 stepped	 in	 to	 prevent	 the	 worst	 from	 happening.	 How	 did	 the	
interventions	 of	 public	 authorities	 to	 those	 runs	 affect	 the	 status	 of	 ABCPs,	
overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares	within	the	hybridity	of	public	and	private	credit	
money?	 To	 which	 extend	 did	 they	 alter	 the	 scope	 of	 public	 control	 over	 the	
shadow	money	supply?	And	what	explains	the	conduct	of	the	public	authorities?	
	
As	 the	 analysis	 will	 demonstrate,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 U.S.	
Treasury	 first	 tried	 to	 calm	down	 the	 runs	with	market-based	solutions.	When	
this	 proved	 unsuccessful,	 they	 created	 public	 backstops	 to	 tame	 the	 run.	 As	 a	
result,	 the	authorities	 forced	ABCPs	 to	break	par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits	whilst	
they	sustained	par	clearance	of	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares.	The	emergency	
backstops	 induced	 a	 temporal,	 yet	 substantial	 increase	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 public	
control	over	the	monetary	system.	The	actions	of	the	U.S.	authorities	were	driven	
by	the	crisis	dynamics	which	predetermined	the	kind	of	public	intervention	that	
was	possible	 and	necessary.	 This	 points	 towards	 a	 functionalist	 explanation	 of	
the	role	that	politics	played	for	institutional	change	in	the	monetary	system.	
	
Figure	5	points	out	in	terms	of	the	Money	Matrix	how	the	public-private	
hybridity	of	money	looked	like	in	the	year	after	Lehman’s	collapse.	In	effect,	the	
backstops	 extended	 core	 aspects	 of	 the	 public-private	 partnership	 for	 deposit	
creation,	which	give	deposits	the	status	of	private-public	money,	and	applied	it	to	
overnight	 repos	 and	 MMF	 shares.	 This	 framework	 for	 deposits	 had	 been	
established	 in	 1913	 with	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act	 and	 in	 1933	 with	 the	
Emergency	Banking	Act	 and	 the	Glass-Steagall	 Act.	 After	 the	 third	wave	 of	 the	
crisis,	 the	Fed	and	 the	Treasury—with	 their	 coordinated	decision	 to	guarantee	
MMF	 shares	 and	backstop	 repos—assumed	 full	 responsibility	 for	both	 shadow	
money	forms	to	sustain	par.	With	ABCPs	largely	driven	out	of	the	market	in	late	
2007,	 the	 only	 truly	 private	 money	 form	 remaining	 were	 uninsured	 bank	
deposits,	 although	 the	 insurance	 limit	 had	 been	 increased	 from	 $100.000	 to	
$250.000	 per	 person	 in	 October	 2008	 (FDIC	 2008).	 In	 the	 year	 after	 Lehman,	
insured	bank	deposits,	MMF	shares	and	repos	—with	their	backstops	on	public	
balance	sheets—were	all	part	of	the	public	money	supply.	
	
FIGURE	5:	The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	in	the	year	after	Lehman)	
	
The	 subsequent	 discussion	 will	 detail	 how	 the	 political	 interventions	
affected	 the	 three	 forms	 of	 shadow	 money.	 It	 will	 first	 address	 the	 policy	
interventions	 on	 the	ABCP	market,	which	was	 affected	 in	 the	 first	wave	of	 the	
crisis,	followed	by	an	analysis	of	the	intervention	on	the	repo	market,	which	was	
subject	to	runs	in	all	three	of	the	waves,	and	the	market	for	MMF	shares	that	was	
only	affected	in	the	third	wave.		 	
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3.1	Asset-backed	Commercial	Papers	
	
The	 ABCP	market	was	 hit	 early	 on	 in	 the	 crisis.	 In	 August	 2007,	 Countrywide	
Securities,	which	 funded	 itself	 both	 on	 the	 commercial	 paper	 and	 the	 tri-party	
repo	market,	got	into	trouble	with	its	business	model	of	originating,	securitising	
and	selling	mortgages.	When	Countrywide	announced	disappointing	earnings,	a	
number	of	ABCP	programmes	had	 to	extend	the	maturities	of	 their	papers	and	
eventually	defaulted.	Investors	became	unwilling	to	continue	rolling	over	ABCPs	
and	 yields	 on	 newly	 issued	 ABCPs	 increased	 sharply.	 This	was	 analogous	 to	 a	
classical	 bank	 run	 during	 which	 depositors	 withdrew	 their	 deposits	 from	
commercial	 banks	 (Covitz	 et	 al.	 2009:	 2,	 13).	 The	 run	 had	 an	 international	
dimension;	 for	 example,	 the	 first	 insolvencies	 occurred	 in	 Germany	 by	 IKB	
Deutsche	Industriebank	and	Sachsen	Landesbank.	The	losses	that	SPVs	incurred	
due	 to	 their	 inability	 to	 roll	 over	 ABCPs	 had	 to	 be	 primarily	 borne	 by	 their	
sponsoring	institutions	which	had	issued	implicit	or	explicit	guarantees	(Acharya	
and	Schnabl	2010:	40).	
	
To	 attenuate	 the	 rising	 panic,	 the	 Fed	 clarified	 in	 August	 2007	 that	
investment-quality	 ABCPs	 would	 be	 accepted	 as	 collateral	 for	 its	 discount	
window	 (Covitz	 et	 al.	 2009:	 42-43)	 and	 reacted	with	 traditional	 expansionary	
monetary	 policy	 from	 September	 (Cecchetti	 2008:	 13).	 In	 parallel,	 Treasury	
Secretary	 Paulson	 pushed	 towards	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	market-based	 plan	 to	
cushion	 the	 credit	 crunch	 on	 the	 ABCP	 market.	 In	 October,	 three	 major	 U.S.	
financial	 institutions—Citigroup,	 JPMorgan	 Chase	 and	 Bank	 of	 America—
followed	 up	 and	 suggested	 to	 introduce	 the	 ‘Master	 Liquidity	 Enhancement	
Conduit’	 as	 a	 privately	 funded	 liquidity	 backstop	 (Covitz	 et	 al.	 2009:	 43).	
However,	 the	 financial	 industry	was	not	 able	 to	 agree	 on	 joint	 actions	 to	 push	
through	the	plan	and	buried	it	in	December	2007	(Ellis	and	Rooney	2007).		
	
While	the	attempted	market-based	solution	turned	out	ineffective,	policy-
makers	 saw	 themselves	 forced	 to	 intervene	more	 substantially,	 yet	 still	within	
the	 conventional	 framework	 of	monetary	management.	 The	 Fed	 calmed	 down	
the	run	on	ABCPs	by	establishing	the	Term	Auction	Facility	(TAF)	as	an	extended	
discount	 window,	 which	 gave	 additional	 liquidity	 support	 to	 the	 commercial	
banks	that	sponsored	the	SPVs	and	thus	had	to	bear	the	losses	from	the	run	on	
ABCPs.	Effectively,	the	Fed	offered	Treasury	bills	as	substitutes	for	the	defaulting	
ABCPs	that	the	market	no	longer	wanted	(Mehrling	2011:	120).	In	addition,	the	
Fed	created	reciprocal	Swap	Lines	with	the	ECB	and	the	Swiss	National	Bank	as	
an	extension	of	the	TAF	to	other	financial	systems.	The	measure	was	necessary	
due	 to	 the	 international	 entanglement	 of	 the	ABCP	market	 (cf.	 Cecchetti	 2008:	
15).	 The	 Swap	 Lines	 expanded	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 Fed’s	 emergency	 liquidity	
injections	beyond	U.S.	borders	and	contributed	to	cushioning	the	effects	that	the	
run	 had	 on	 the	 liquidity	 of	 non-U.S.-based	 parent	 institutions.	 Later,	 the	 Swap	
Lines	were	also	extended	to	other	major	central	banks	(Mehrling	2015b).	
	
How	did	this	affect	the	role	of	ABCPs	in	the	monetary	system?	The	Fed’s	
intervention	effectively	dried	out	the	ABCP	market	and	led	to	a	disappearance	of	
ABCPs	 as	 shadow	 money	 because	 they	 could	 no	 longer	 sustain	 par	 vis-à-vis	
deposits.	 The	 Fed	 did	 not	 support	 or	 guarantee	 ABCPs;	 instead,	 it	 forced	 the	
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banks	that	acted	as	private	sponsors	to	bear	the	losses	but	then	helped	them	out	
with	 the	TAF.	 Figure	6—based	on	Covitz	 et	 al.	 (2009:	 34)—visualizes	how	 the	
intervention	 changed	 the	 setup	of	 the	ABCP	market.	 The	TAF	was	used	by	 the	
Fed	 to	 cushion	 the	 effects	 on	 commercial	 banks	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	
liquidation	 of	 ABCPs.	 Banks	 had	 to	 look	 for	 an	 alternative	 source	 of	 funding	
instead	 of	 ABCPs,	 and	 the	 TAF	 provided	 it	 as	 a	 ‘robustified’	 discount	 window	
(Mehrling	2011),	which	allowed	investors	to	shift	to	other	assets.	The	issuance	of	
ABCPs	declined	sharply	during	the	first	wave	of	 the	crisis	 in	the	 last	months	of	
2007	(Anderson	and	Gascon	2009:	603).3	
	
FIGURE	6:	Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	ABCP	market	
	
	
3.2	Repurchase	Agreements	
	
While	 ABCPs	 were	 only	 hit	 in	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 the	 crisis	 and	 then	 lost	 their	
relevance,	 runs	on	repo	occurred	 in	all	 three	waves.	 In	particular,	 the	 tri-party	
repo	market	was	affected.	 In	contrast	to	the	bilateral	repo	market	 in	which	the	
dealer	and	its	counterparty	are	processing	the	repo	transaction	on	their	own,	the	
tri-party	 repo	market	 is	operated	by	 JPMorgan	Chase	 (JPMC)	and	Bank	of	New	
York	Mellon	(BNYM)	as	custodian	banks	that	facilitate	the	repo	transaction.	The	
custodian	 banks	 settle	 the	 repo	 transactions	 on	 their	 balance	 sheets,	 offer	
custodial	 and	 collateral	 management	 services,	 and	 eventually	 grant	 intra-day	
credit	 (Copeland	 et	 al.	 2011).	 Among	 the	 financial	 institutions	 registered	 as	
securities	 dealers	 on	 tri-party	 repo,	 which	 issue	 repo	 certificates	 as	 shadow	
money,	are	all	the	primary	dealers	that	serve	as	counterparties	for	open	market	
transactions	 with	 the	 Fed.	 In	 2007,	 prior	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 crisis,	 this	
included	the	Big	Five	U.S.	investment	banks	Merrill	Lynch,	Goldman	Sachs,	Bear	
Stearns,	Lehman	Brothers	and	JPMorgan.		
	
How	 did	 the	 interventions	 to	 the	 crisis	 affect	 public	 control	 over	
overnight	repos	as	shadow	money	throughout	the	three	waves?	
	
In	the	first	wave,	the	troubles	that	Countrywide	was	facing	spilled	over	on	
tri-party	 repo.	 The	 bursting	 of	 the	 U.S.	 housing	 bubble	 made	 the	 value	 of	
securities	tied	to	real	estate	prices	collapse	(cf.	Covitz	et	al.	2009:	2).	In	August	
2007,	BNYM	feared	an	immediate	default	of	Countrywide,	did	not	want	to	grant	
intra-day	 credit	 anymore	 and	 thus	 threatened	 to	 no	 longer	 facilitate	
Countrywide’s	tri-party	repo	transactions	(Paulson	2010).	The	Fed	was	urged	by	
both	 Countrywide	 and	 BNYM	 to	 intervene	 and	 stop	 the	 rising	 panic.	 Yet,	
corresponding	to	its	preference	for	market-based	solutions,	the	Fed	declined	and	
instead	 facilitated	 an	 agreement	 between	 both	 companies	 according	 to	 which	
BNYM	 continued	 offering	 its	 services	 to	 Countrywide,	 while	 Countrywide	
upgraded	 the	 quality	 of	 its	 collateral	 (Geithner	 2014:	 122-126).	 The	 Fed	 thus	
managed	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	 without	 having	 to	 step	 in,	 back	 the	 tri-party	 repo	
market	and	publicly	guarantee	par	clearance	of	repos	vis-à-vis	deposits.	
	
In	the	second	wave,	however,	the	Fed	had	to	change	its	approach	towards	
protecting	 the	 repo	 market	 substantially.	 Bear	 Stearns—a	 major	 securities	
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dealer	 in	 the	 tri-party	repo	market—was	at	 the	brink	of	collapse.	Again,	public	
officials	feared	a	run	on	repo.	The	strategy	of	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	was	two-
fold:	On	the	one	hand,	they	organized	a	take-over	of	Bear	Stearns	by	JPMC,	which	
allowed	 for	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 systemically	 relevant	 functions	 of	 Bear	 as	 a	
securities	dealer	under	the	umbrella	of	JPMC	(Ennis	2011:	389).	Still,	this	turned	
out	 insufficient	 to	 ease	 the	 financial	 strains.	Hence,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 the	Fed	
had	 to	 invoke	 its	 emergency	 powers	 provided	 in	 Article	 13(3)	 of	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	Act,	which	give	it	the	right	to	lend	to	non-banks	in	‘unusual	and	exigent	
circumstances’,	and	established	emergency	liquidity	facilities	in	March	2008	that	
allowed	 tri-party	 dealers	 to	 directly	 tap	 its	 balance	 sheet:	 the	 Term	 Securities	
Lending	Facility	(TSLF)	and	the	Primary	Dealer	Credit	Facility	(PDCF).		
	
Creating	 the	 TSLF	 and	 the	 PDCF	 was	 a	 pivotal	 change	 in	 the	 crisis	
intervention	strategy	compared	to	the	first	wave,	advanced	by	the	Fed’s	top-level	
officials	 (Geithner	 2014:	 143).	 The	 Fed	 now	 assumed	 full	 responsibility	 to	
sustain	the	functionality	of	tri-party	repo	by	directly	providing	public	backstops	
to	issuers	of	shadow	money:	After	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble,	repo	market	
participants	 stopped	 lending	 to	 each	 other	 against	 collateral	 connected	 to	
mortgage	securities	and	strongly	increased	haircuts.	Dealers	struggled	to	finance	
their	 term	 repos	 and	 looked	 for	 alternative	 funding	 sources,	 mostly	 in	 vein	
(Fleming	 et	 al.	 2009:	 2-3).	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 Fed	 created	 the	 TSLF	 to	 allow	
securities	 dealers	 to	 exchange	 their	 bad	 collateral	 against	 Treasury	 securities,	
which	were	still	acceptable	for	their	counterparties.	Via	the	PDCF,	the	Fed	had	to	
compensate	the	plummeted	repo	demand,	took	the	lending	side	in	tri-party	repo	
transactions	 and	 bought	 the	 dealers’	 overnight	 repos	 against	 a	 penalty	 rate	
(Ennis	 2011:	 392).	 The	 Fed	 thus	 ‘opened	 the	 discount	 window	 to	 investment	
banks	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 Great	 Depression’	 (Paulson	 2010:	 116).	 This	
step	 had	 become	 necessary	 because	 the	 available	 alternative	 private	 funding	
sources	 could	 not	 provide	 liquidity	 at	 the	 scale	 necessary	 to	 tame	 the	 run	 on	
repo	(cf.	Mehrling	2011).	
	
In	the	third	wave,	to	avoid	systemic	meltdown,	the	Fed	had	to	make	up	for	
a	 system-wide	 freezing	of	 repo	 lending	and	effectively	dragged	 the	entire	 repo	
market	on	its	balance	sheet.	The	financial	crisis	reached	its	peak	when	Lehman	
Brothers,	 another	 major	 securities	 dealer	 in	 the	 tri-party	 repo	 market,	
reportedly	 was	 ‘only	 days	 away’	 from	 bankruptcy	 and	 threatened	 to	 put	 the	
entire	system	at	risk	(Adrian	et	al.	2009:	4).	Again,	U.S.	authorities	fought	on	two	
fronts	to	prevent	the	tri-party	repo	market	from	collapsing:	They	had	the	double	
strategy	 of	 arranging	 a	 take-over	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers’	 securities	 dealer	 and	
supporting	 market	 resilience	 with	 its	 liquidity	 facilities.	 As	 the	 take-over	 of	
Lehman	by	 the	British	bank	Barclays	Capital	 failed,	 the	 liquidity	 facilities	were	
the	 last	 resort.	When	Lehman	 filed	 for	bankruptcy	 in	September	2008,	 the	Fed	
announced	 that	 it	 would	 radically	 expand	 the	 collateral	 acceptability	 for	 the	
PDCF.	Initially,	it	had	only	accepted	high-quality	collateral	that	was	also	eligible	
for	 its	 open	 market	 operations.	 From	 then	 on,	 loans	 via	 PDCF	 could	 include	
anything	 that	was	 acceptable	 in	 the	 tri-party	 repo	 system,	 e.g.	 non-investment	
grade	bonds	 and	 stocks.	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	usage	of	 the	PDCF	 skyrocketed	
(Ennis	2011:	392).	
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What	are	the	implications	of	these	interventions	for	the	status	of	repos	in	
the	monetary	system?	Figure	7—based	on	Copeland	et	al.	(2012)—demonstrates	
that	via	PDCF	and	TSLF,	the	Fed	granted	dealers	direct	access	to	its	balance	sheet	
and	 stood	 ready	 to	 guarantee	 the	 repos	 that	 dealers	 had	 issued	 as	 IOUs.	 If	
necessary,	 dealers	 could	 first	 exchange	 their	bad	 collateral	 at	 the	TSLF	against	
good	 one	 and	 then	 use	 the	 good	 one	 to	 borrow	 deposits	 from	 the	 PDCF.	 By	
letting	securites	dealers	tap	its	balance	sheet,	the	Fed	became—in	the	words	of	
Mehrling	 (2011)—the	Dealer	 of	 Last	Resort.	 PDCF	 and	TSLF	 effectively	 turned	
overnight	 repos	 into	 a	 private-public	money	 form.	When	 established	 in	 March	
2008,	 the	 PDCF	 still	 had	 relatively	 high	 quality	 standards	 for	 the	 collateral	 it	
accepted.	Arguably,	this	transformed	merely	those	overnight	repos	into	private-
public	money	 that	had	high-quality	collateral	 in	beforehand,	 i.e.	 those	 issued	by	
dealer	 banks’	 government	 desk.	 Only	 when	 the	 collateral	 standards	 were	
lowered	in	September	2008,	the	overnight	repos	 issued	by	dealer	banks’	credit	
desks	 became	 public-private	 money	 as	 well.	 Thus,	 the	 Fed’s	 intervention	 has	
extended	 the	 public	 framework	 to	 backstop	 privately	 credit	 money	 forms	 on	
repos.	 It	 exercised	 its	 power	 as	 a	 public	 authority	 to	 guarantee	 that	 repos	
continued	to	trade	at	par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits.	
	
FIGURE	7:	Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	tri-party	repo	market	
	
	
3.3	MMF	shares	
	
After	the	collapse	of	Lehman	Brothers,	the	spreading	panic	also	affected	the	MMF	
industry.	Investors	in	MMFs	began	converting	their	shares	into	bank	deposits	as	
private-public	money	 that	 was	 covered	 by	 the	 FDIC.	 Most	 MMFs	 were	 able	 to	
withstand	the	run	and	keep	up	constant	net	asset	value	because	they	had	parent	
institutions	 supporting	 them	 with	 liquidity	 as	 private	 backstops	 (Mehrling	
2011).	 However,	 the	 Reserve	 Primary	 Fund—a	 family	 enterprise	 without	 a	
parent	institution—was	no	longer	able	to	sustain	a	constant	net	asset	value	and,	
by	paying	only	97	cents	on	 the	dollar,	 ‘broke	 the	buck’	on	16	September	2008.	
This	further	fuelled	the	run	on	the	MMF	market.	
	
Those	market	developments	made	the	Treasury	and	the	Fed	act	jointly	to	
publicly	backstop	 the	market	 for	MMF	shares.	The	Treasury	 announced	a	one-
year	 ‘Temporary	 Guarantee	 Programme	 for	Money	Market	 Funds’	 (Temporary	
Guarantee)	 as	 a	 public	 promise	 that	 MMF	 shares	 sustain	 par	 vis-à-vis	 bank	
deposits	 to	 avoid	 that	 all	 investors	 pull	 out	 their	 money	 at	 the	 same	 time	
(Bernanke	 2013:	 82).	 Funded	 via	 the	 Exchange	 Stabilization	 Fund	 (ESF),	 the	
Treasury	insured	the	holdings	of	any	MMF	willing	to	pay	a	participation	fee.	The	
plan	was	adopted	in	a	call	among	Hank	Paulson,	Tim	Geithner,	Ben	Bernanke	and	
Christopher	Cox,	head	of	 the	SEC,	as	well	 as	 their	members	of	 staff.	To	protect	
uninsured	bank	deposits,	FDIC	chairman	Sheila	Bair	later	amended	the	rules	for	
the	 Temporary	 Guarantee	 and	 asserted	 that	 merely	 those	 customer	 balances	
were	 insured	 that	had	been	 in	 the	MMFs	before	 the	guarantee	was	announced	
(Paulson	 2010:	 262-263).	 The	 Fed,	 in	 turn,	 established	 the	 ‘Asset-backed	
Commercial	Paper	Money	Market	Mutual	Fund	Liquidity	Facility’	(AMLF).	Via	the	
AMLF,	the	Fed	lent	money	to	banks,	which	in	turn	bought	assets	from	MMFs	to	
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give	 them	 the	 liquidity	 necessary	 to	 convert	 MMF	 shares	 into	 deposits	 on	
demand	(Bernanke	2013:	82).	
	
Figure	8	highlights	 the	 impact	of	 the	two	measures	on	the	MMF	market.	
The	Temporary	Guarantee	paralleled	the	logic	of	deposit	insurance,	and	was	thus	
a	 classic	 response	 to	 a	 classic	 bank	 run	 (Bernanke	 2013:	 83).	 It	 is	 therefore	
adequate	to	say	that	MMF	shares	were	a	form	of	public-private	money	while	the	
Guarantee	Program	was	in	place.	While	Prime	MMFs	were	mainly	subject	to	the	
run,	the	Temporary	Guarantee	affected	all	MMF	types.	The	AMLF,	in	contrast,	did	
not	grant	MMFs	as	shadow	banks	access	to	the	Fed’s	balance	sheet.	The	funds	it	
supplied	in	support	for	MMFs	were	distributed	via	banks.		
	
FIGURE	8:	Impact	of	the	public	intervention	on	the	MMF	market	
	
This	empirical	analysis	makes	 the	case	 for	a	 functionalist	explanation	of	
institutional	 change	 in	 the	 monetary	 system	 (cf.	 Strange	 1996,	 Porter	 2003).	
Throughout	 the	 three	 waves	 of	 the	 crisis,	 the	 Fed	 and	 the	 Treasury	 were	
repeatedly	 forced	to	 intervene	 in	 the	money	market	and	support	 the	 issuers	of	
shadow	 money.	 The	 scope	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the	 interventions	 increased	
continuously	 from	wave	to	wave:	 In	the	first	wave,	 the	public	authorities	could	
still	 act	 relatively	 conventionally.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 ideational	 elite	 consensus	
typical	 for	 ‘disembedded	 liberalism’	 (cf.	 Blyth	 2002,	 Widmaier	 2016),	 policy-
makers	had	initially	put	up	the	self-restraint	to	intervene	as	little	as	possible	and	
always	 mitigate	 solutions	 that	 minimized	 public	 intervention.	 They	 only	
abandoned	 this	 approach	 when	 the	 run	 on	 shadow	 money	 had	 become	 so	
systemic	 that	 in	 their	 subjective	 perception,	 they	 had	 no	 other	 choice	 but	 to	
backstop	 the	 remaining	 shadow	money	 forms	 (Interviews	 5,	 7).	 Hence,	 in	 the	
second	 and	 third	 wave,	 they	 had	 to	 adopt	 unprecedented	 measures	 that	
increased	 the	 scope	 of	 public	 control	 over	 the	 money	 supply	 in	 a	 dramatic	
fashion.	 In	 line	 with	 functionalism,	 this	 paradigm	 shift	 was	 brought	 about	 by	
public	 authorities	merely	 reacting	 in	 response	 to	 the	 endogenous	 unfolding	 of	
the	 crisis.	 It	 is	 this	 aspect	 of	 timing	 that	 explains	 why	 ABCPs	 did	 not	 receive	
public	backstops,	whilst	repos	and	MMF	shares	did.	
	
Establishing	 the	 shadow	 money	 backstops	 was	 a	 unique	 moment	 of	
political	power	(see	Schwartz	2009	for	a	broader	discussion	of	power	associated	
with	the	crisis).	However,	 in	 line	with	the	functionalist	reading	purported	here,	
the	 possibilities	 and	 the	 necessities	 of	 an	 intervention	 had	 already	 been	
circumscribed	by	the	unfolding	of	events	in	the	runs	on	shadow	money.	Political	
decision-makers	had	the	power	to	say	Yes	or	No—in	a	situation	when	a	No,	with	
all	foreseeable	consequences,	was	simply	perceived	as	intolerable	(Interview	1).	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Yes	 of	 the	 relevant	 political	 decision-makers	 was	 likely	
prejudiced	by	the	fact	that	they	were	part	of	 the	same	epistemic	community	as	
their	counterparts	from	the	financial	industry	(cf.	Tsingou	2015).	
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4.	The	legacy	of	2008:	What	Role	for	Shadow	Money	in	the	Post-Crisis	
Monetary	System?	
	
The	backstops	for	MMF	shares	and	repos	had	only	been	established	for	a	limited	
period	after	the	collapse	of	Lehman.	The	Temporary	Guarantee	was	in	place	from	
September	 2008	 to	 September	 2009	 (U.S.	 Treasury	 2009).	 The	 PDCF	 and	 the	
TSLF,	 after	 several	 prolongations,	 were	 finally	 shut	 down	 in	 February	 2010	
(Federal	Reserve	2010).	How	has	 the	 status	of	 the	 three	 shadow	money	 forms	
within	 the	 hybridity	 of	 public	 and	private	 credit	money	developed	 since	 then?	
What	 is	 the	scope	of	public	control	over	 the	shadow	money	supply	 today?	And	
what	 explains	 the	 direction	 in	 which	 post-crisis	 regulatory	 process	 has	 been	
going?	
	
Since	the	heyday	of	 the	crisis,	 two	divergent	processes	have	been	taking	
place:	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	status	of	ABCPs	and	Prime	MMF	shares	as	shadow	
money	 has	 been	 abrogated.	 Both	 instruments	 no	 longer	 trade	 at	 par	 to	 bank	
deposits,	 hence	 their	 function	 as	 cash	 substitutes	 for	 institutional	 investors	 is	
gone.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 overnight	 repos	 and	 Government	 MMF	 shares	 have	
been	consolidated	as	shadow	money	under	public	control.	Thus,	 the	process	of	
extending	the	public-private	framework	for	deposit	creation	on	shadow	money,	
which	 had	 been	 started	 during	 the	 crisis,	 has	 found	 continuation	 in	 the	 post-
crisis	 regulatory	 process.	 However,	 this	 framework	 for	 deposits	 does	 not	
comprise	liquidity	and	solvency	backstops	but	also	measures	for	regulation	and	
supervision.	 In	 this,	 the	 public-private	 framework	 for	 the	 creation	 of	
Government	 MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos—as	 tangible	 regulatory	
innovations	 did	 not	 materialize—has	 not	 reached	 the	 same	 degree	 of	
sophistication	 as	 that	 for	 bank	 deposits.	 Still,	 both	 shadow	 money	 forms	
constitute	an	even	more	 integral	part	of	 the	U.S.	money	supply	 than	before	 the	
crisis	(cf.	Gabor	and	Vestergaard	2016).	They	retain	their	status	as	public-private	
money	as	public	authorities	continue	to	assume	responsibility	for	par	clearance	
vis-à-vis	deposits	(cf.	Figure	9).	
	
FIGURE	9:	The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	since	2014)	
	
	
4.1	De-monetising	ABCPs	and	Prime	MMF	shares	
	
As	 the	 result	of	 regulatory	 reforms	between	2009	and	2014,	ABCPs	and	Prime	
MMF	shares	have	lost	their	status	as	shadow	money	as	they	are	no	longer	able	to	
sustain	par	or	quasi-par	vis-à-vis	bank	deposits.	Regulators	‘de-monetised’	them	
and	forced	them	to	drop	out	of	the	Money	Matrix.	
	
In	 the	 ABCP	 market,	 regulatory	 changes	 were	 introduced	 regarding	
accounting	 standards	 after	 the	 crisis	 that	 led	 to	 a	 strong	 decrease	 in	 ABCP	
issuance.	In	2010,	the	‘favorable	risk	capital	treatment’	has	been	dropped.	With	
this	decision,	regulators	reversed	the	decision	taken	in	2003,	which	had	made	it	
possible	 for	 sponsoring	 banks	 to	 exclude	 ABCPs	 from	 their	 risk-weight	 asset	
base	and	had	thus	facilitated	the	rise	of	ABCP	as	shadow	money	(Chen	2015:	8-
10).	 The	 relevant	 authorities	 involved	 in	 this	 decision	 were	 the	 Financial	
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Accounting	 Standards	 Board	 (FASB),	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 FDIC	 and	 the	
Treasury.	With	 a	 joint	 document	 published	 in	 June	 2009,	 they	 announced	 the	
‘exclusion	 of	 certain	 consolidated	 asset-backed	 commercial	 paper	 programs	
from	 risk-weighted	 assets’	 (OCC	2010:	 1).	Hence,	 banks	 are	 not	 only	 forced	 to	
consolidate	 the	 ABCP-issuing	 SPVs	 onto	 their	 balance	 sheets,	 but	 also	 have	 to	
keep	 risk	 capital	 for	 the	 SPVs	 (Chen	 2015:	 9,	 51).	 The	 removal	 of	 preferential	
accounting	 rules	 made	 ABCPs	 not	 only	 lose	 their	 status	 as	 shadow	money	 de	
facto,	but	also	by	regulation	(Interview	5).	
	
For	 MMF	 shares,	 the	 SEC	 introduced	 a	 substantial	 distinction	 between	
Prime	 MMFs,	 which	 predominantly	 invest	 in	 private	 assets	 with	 floating	 or	
variable	 rates,	 as	 well	 as	 Government	 and	 Tax-exempt	 MMFs,	 which	 invest	
almost	exclusively	 in	public	debt.	The	 regulatory	 change	 for	MMFs	occurred	 in	
two	main	steps:	the	Amendments	to	Rule	2a-7	of	the	1940	Investment	Company	
Act	 in	 2010	 and	 2014.	 In	 2010,	 the	 SEC	 introduced	 five	 moderate	 new	 rules	
aimed	 at	 limiting	 the	 risk-taking	 of	 MMFs	 (SEC	 2010:	 10060).	 After	 the	 2010	
Amendment,	debates	emerged	about	whether	the	changes	were	sufficient	(Lynch	
2013).	 In	 November	 2012,	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Oversight	 Council	 (FSOC)	
suggested	on	 the	basis	of	 its	 authority	granted	by	 the	Dodd-Frank-Act	 that	 the	
SEC	 should	 implement	 further	 reforms.	 In	 June	 2013,	 the	 SEC	 published	 two	
alternative	 proposals:	 One	 suggested	 that	 all	 non-government	 MMFs	 should	
introduce	 a	 floating	 net	 asset	 value	 and	 thus	 abandon	 the	 guarantee	 to	 trade	
their	 shares	 at	 par.	 The	 other	 foresaw	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 two	 percent	
withdrawal	 fee	 for	 Prime	 MMFs	 if	 their	 five-day	 liquidity	 dropped	 below	 15	
percent	of	its	total	assets	(SIFMA	2015).	In	2014,	the	SEC	adopted	both	options—
floating	 NAV	 and	 withdrawal	 fees	 (SEC	 2014)—and	 made	 Prime	 MMF	 shares	
lose	the	status	of	shadow	money.		
	
	
4.2	Sustaining	Government	MMF	shares	and	Repos	as	shadow	money	
	
In	contrast	to	the	de-monetisation	of	ABCPs	and	Prime	MMF	shares,	Government	
MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos	 sustain	 par	 vis-à-vis	 bank	 deposits.	 Public	
authorities	 continue	 to	 support	 par	 clearance	 as	 the	 emergency	 backstops	
established	 during	 the	 crisis	 remain	 implicitly	 in	 place	 and	 the	 Fed,	 via	 the	
Reverse	 Repo	 Facility,	 has	 de	 facto	 assumed	 the	 role	 of	 a	 repo	 dealer	 of	 last	
resort.	There	have	been	initiatives	to	also	extend	deposit-like	regulations	on	the	
remaining	shadow	money	forms,	but	no	comprising	measures	have	been	passed.	
	
An	apparent	consequence	of	the	explicit	emergency	backstops’	expiration	
would	be	to	assume	that	public	authorities	no	longer	adopt	responsibility	for	par	
clearance	 of	 Government	 MMF	 shares	 and	 overnight	 repos.	 However,	 as	
indicated	in	a	number	of	interviews,	scholars,	regulators	and	market	participants	
are	of	the	opinion	that	the	backstops	are	still	implicitly	in	place	and	could	be	re-
enacted	by	the	Fed	and	the	Treasury	any	time	if	necessary	(Interviews	1,	4,	5,	6).	
While	the	Dodd-Frank-Act—the	main	political	response	to	the	2007-9	Financial	
Crisis—makes	it	more	difficult	for	the	Fed	to	invoke	its	Article	13	(3)	emergency	
powers,	 there	 is	 still	 the	 possibility	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 Fed	 could	 not	 implement	
measures	on	 the	basis	of	 those	powers	again	as	 a	purely	 technocratic	decision	
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but	would	require	political	permission;	still,	everybody	expects	that	 in	times	of	
extreme	financial	strain,	 it	will	very	quickly	receive	such	permission	(Interview	
1).	 As	 to	 MacDonald	 (1996:	 8-11),	 implicit	 guarantee	 schemes—though	 not	
legally	 equivalent—are	 comparable	 to	 explicit	 ones	 as	 they	 have	 the	 same	
economic	 and	 functional	 effects.	While	 an	 explicit	 guarantee	 scheme	would	 be	
established	by	a	law	that	lays	out	in	detail	who	is	entitled	to	what	under	which	
circumstances,	an	implicit	guarantee	scheme	allows	public	authorities	to	decide	
about	 protection	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis,	 leaves	 flexibility	 and	 reduces	
administrative	costs.	This	applies	to	the	Treasury’s	guarantee	for	MMF	shares	as	
well	as	the	PDCF	and	the	TSLF.	Therefore,	as	depicted	in	Figure	10	and	Figure	11,	
due	to	the	precedents	created	 in	2008,	Government	MMF	shares	and	overnight	
repos	are	still	implicitly	backstopped.	
	
FIGURE	10:	Implicit	backstops	for	Government	MMF	shares	
	
Moreover,	 the	 Fed’s	 Reverse	 Repo	 Facility	 (RRP)	 is	 an	 institutional	
innovation	that	functions	as	an	explicit	permanent	backstop	for	overnight	repos.		
The	Fed	established	the	RRP	 in	2013	as	a	novel	 tool	 to	regain	control	over	 the	
federal	 funds	 rate	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound.	 It	 is	 an	 overnight,	 risk-free	
instrument	 to	which	not	only	banks	but	also	MMFs	and	securities	dealers	have	
access.	 A	 transaction	 via	 RRP	 ‘is	 economically	 similar	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
borrowing	 from	 a	 counterparty,	 with	 the	 loan	 secured	 by	 collateral	 from	 the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 security	 portfolio	 (Frost	 et	 al.	 2015:	 6).	 Primarily,	 RRP	was	
intended	to	be	a	monetary	policy	tool.	An	alternative,	albeit	contested	(Interview	
1),	interpretion	is	that	the	RRP	represents	the	continuation	of	the	Fed’s	Dealer	of	
Last	Resort	function—with	the	Fed	acting	as	an	alternative	dealer	that	tri-party	
repo	 counterparties	 could	 turn	 to	 (cf.	 Figure	 11).	 As	 to	 McCulley	 and	 Pozsar	
(2014),	RRP	 ‘gives	 shadow	banks	an	account	 at	 the	Fed,	 similar	 to	 the	 reserve	
accounts	 that	 deposit-taking	 institutions	 keep	 there’.	 In	 December	 2015,	 after	
some	 experimenting,	 the	 Fed	 turned	 the	 RRP	 into	 a	 full-allotment	 facility	
(Boesler	and	Condon	2015)	and	made	the	backstop	unlimited.		
	
FIGURE	11:	Implicit	backstops	for	overnight	repos	and	Reverse	Repo	Facility	
	
In	 post-crisis	 regulation,	 there	 were	 considerations	 to	 set	much	 tighter	
standards	for	the	issuance	of	Government	MMF	shares	and	overnight	repos,	but	
the	 actual	 regulatory	 changes	 implemented	 remained	 rather	 marginal:	 For	
overnight	repos,	on	the	one	hand,	some	new	regulations	have	been	passed,	most	
importantly	the	introduction	of	the	Supplementary	Leverage	Ratio	which	forces	
securities	 dealers	 to	 keep	 a	 minimum	 ratio	 of	 capital	 to	 total	 assets	 of	 five	
percent	 (Duffie	 2016).	 Still,	 more	 far-reaching	 reforms—e.g.	 to	 reduce	 the	
possibility	of	fire	sales,	to	control	the	setting	of	haircuts	or	to	manage	collateral	
constraints—did	not	materialize	 although	 the	 FSB	had	made	 repo	 regulation	 a	
priority	in	their	post-crisis	reform	agenda	(Gabor	2016).	For	MMFs,	on	the	other	
hand,	 the	 Group	 of	 Thirty—a	 private	 body	 of	 financial	 experts—called	 for	
prudential	regulation	and	supervision	next	to	explicit	government	insurance	and	
access	 to	central	bank	 liquidity	 if	 they	wanted	to	 issue	shares	 trading	at	par	 to	
deposits	 (Fink	 2011:	 254).	 In	 2012,	 Mary	 Schapiro—Chair	 of	 the	 SEC	 from	
January	2009	 to	December	2012—proposed	 to	make	MMFs	more	bank-like	by	
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introducing	 capital	 buffers.	 However,	 the	 FSOC	 with	 its	 intervention	 forced	
Schapiro	to	drop	the	proposal	(Lynch	2013).	As	a	consequence	of	the	SEC’s	2014	
decision,	Government	MMF	shares	remain	functionally	equivalent	to	deposits	as	
they	keep	their	constant	net-asset	value,	but	are	regulated	differently.	
	
The	findings	demonstrate	that	post-crisis	regulation	broadly	followed	the	
path	trodden	by	the	emergency	crisis	interventions.	The	actions	of	public	actors	
have	largely	pre-determined	the	direction	for	the	phase	of	purposeful	institution	
building	after	the	crisis.	That	U.S.	authorities	had	assumed	the	responsibility	to	
guarantee	par	of	overnight	 repos	and	MMF	shares	during	 the	crisis	 turned	out	
instructive	for	post-crisis	regulation—in	particular,	as	implicit	backstops	remain	
in	 place,	 no	 seismic	 shifts	 happened	 in	 the	 regulatory	 fine-tuning	 and	 ABCPs	
have	not	been	revived.	This	interpretation	corresponds	to	the	contribution	that	
Braun	(2013)	made	on	institutional	change	in	the	moment	of	a	crisis	who	argues	
that	the	emergency	phase	in	a	financial	crisis	is	of	primary	importance	for	future	
institutional	 evolution.	Accordingly,	 the	 runs	 on	 shadow	money	were	 a	 critical	
juncture	 for	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	monetary	 system,	 the	 interventions	 created	 a	
path-dependency	for	its	future	shape.		
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5.	Conclusion	
	
This	article	has	set	out	to	analyse	the	impact	of	the	2007-9	Financial	Crisis	on	the	
monetary	 system.	 To	 this	 end,	 it	 engaged	 with	 the	 economics	 literature	 that	
adopts	a	monetary	angle	on	shadow	banking	and	systematically	focuses	on	near-
monies	created	by	non-bank	financial	institutions,	i.e.	shadow	banks.	Until	2007,	
a	number	of	short-term	financial	instruments	have	taken	on	the	role	of	deposit-
substitutes	or	 ‘shadow	money’.	The	most	important	shadow	money	forms	were	
ABCPs,	overnight	repos	and	MMF	shares.	Using	the	Money	Matrix	as	a	heuristic	
tool,	 the	article	contributes	 to	 IPE	scholarship	by	pointing	out	how	the	crisis—
via	the	political	decisions	made	 in	reaction	to	 it—has	transformed	the	scope	of	
public	control	over	the	money	supply	in	the	U.S.,	with	implications	for	the	rest	of	
the	 world.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 empirical	 analysis,	 the	 emergency	
interventions	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Fed	 and	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 during	 the	 2007-9	
Financial	 Crisis	 have	 effectively	 established	 emergency	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	
backstops	 for	 repos	 and	MMF	 shares,	while	 ABCPs	 lost	 their	 status	 as	 private	
deposit	substitutes.	In	the	course	of	the	post-crisis	regulatory	process,	ABCPs	as	
well	as	shares	of	Prime	MMFs	have	been	further	‘de-monetised’,	while	backstops	
for	overnight	repos	and	Government	MMF	shares	remain	in	place.		
	
This	empirical	analysis	emphasizes	 the	 relevance	of	a	 functionalist	view	
on	the	role	of	politics	regarding	institutional	change	in	the	monetary	system.	The	
financial	 innovations	 that	had	 led	 to	 the	 rise	of	 shadow	money	 forms	 from	 the	
1970s	onwards—despite	some	support	of	regulatory	bodies	and	decisions	(see	
Gabor	 2016,	 Sissoko	 2010)—were	 driven	 by	 private	 enterprise	 (Ricks	 2016),	
and	 so	 was	 the	 unfolding	 of	 the	 crisis	 itself	 in	 autumn	 2007	 (Brunnermeier	
2009).	 Endogenous	 crisis	 dynamics	 directed	 the	 political	 interventions	 in	 the	
crisis,	which	 then	 altered	 the	 setup	of	 the	 shadow	money	 supply	 and	 crucially	
pre-determined	 post-crisis	 regulation	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 to	 fully	 explain	 the	
observed	outcome,	the	proposed	functionalist	view	on	the	role	of	politics	has	to	
be	complemented	by	other	approaches,	most	notably	to	explain	the	regulation	of	
MMF	 shares.	 That	MMF	 shares	were	 not	 treated	 as	 bank	 deposits	 can	well	 be	
explained	by	historical	instutionalist	scholarship	that	focuses	on	the	setup	of	the	
regulatory	 system	 and	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 financial	 industry	 in	 it	 (Fioretos	
2010:	 699).	 The	 SEC,	 which	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 MMF	 regulation,	 has	 an	 inherent	
tendency	to	treat	MMF	liabilities	like	those	of	mutual	funds	and	not	like	those	of	
banks	 because	 this	 is	 its	 mandate.	 Moreover,	 as	 the	 SEC	 is	 not	 politically	
independent,	 lobbying	 efforts	 were	 particulary	 influential	 for	 MMF	 regulation	
(Interview	 4).	 In	 this	 respect,	 scholarship	 that	 pays	 attention	 to	 coalition-
building	and	conflict	among	interest	groups	(see	e.g.	Pagliari	and	Young	2014)	is	
best	 equipped	 to	 explain	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 Government	 and	
Prime	MMF	shares—a	distinct	regulatory	novelty	that	goes	beyond	the	pathway	
pre-determined	by	the	crisis	intervention.	
	
The	findings	of	this	article	provide	the	starting	points	for	further	research	
in	IPE.	On	the	one	hand,	 they	point	towards	further	exploring	the	 international	
dimension	of	those	changes	in	the	monetary	system.	That	both	overnight	repos	
and	 Government	MMF	 shares	 continue	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 public	money	 supply	
today	and	are	likely	to	do	so	in	the	future	constitutes	a	major	transformation	in	
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the	 public	monetary	 system,	 not	 only	 domestically	 in	 the	 U.S.	 but—bearing	 in	
mind	 the	 transnational	 scope	 of	 the	 shadow	 banking	 system—even	 on	 an	
international	 scale.	 As	 we	 continue	 to	 live	 in	 a	 world	 of	 dollar	 hegemony	 (cf.	
Helleiner	2008,	Cohen	and	Benney	2015),	changes	 in	 the	U.S.	monetary	system	
have	immediate	international	implications.	With	the	Fed	effectively	running	the	
international	monetary	system	using	its	balance	sheet	as	the	global	backstop,	the	
C6	swap	lines	established	in	the	first	wave	of	the	crisis	are	likely	to	predetermine	
the	 future	 trajectory	 for	 international	 public	 credit	money	 creation	 via	 central	
bank	 collaboration	 (Mehrling	 2015b).	 The	 innovative	 regulation	 of	 inherently	
international	 repo	markets	 transcending	 the	 old	 consensus	 that	 Gabor	 (2016)	
terms	 the	 ‘impossible	 repo	 trinity’,	 will	 shape	 the	 future	 role	 of	market-based	
finance	 for	 the	 international	 monetary	 system	 (Gabor	 and	 Vestergaard	 2016)	
and	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 backbone	 of	 a	 new	 era	 of	 central	 banking	with	 a	much	
stronger	involvement	of	public	balance	sheets	in	the	money	markets	(Pozsar	and	
Sweeney	2015).	Moreover,	 repos	played	a	key	role	 in	Europe’s	 sovereign	bond	
market	 crisis	 and	 their	 regulatory	 treatment	 is	 of	 crucial	 importance	 for	 the	
future	 of	 the	 Eurozone	 (Gabor	 and	 Ban	 2016).	 Thus,	 to	 understand	 how	 the	
international	 monetary	 system	 evolves	 at	 the	 moment,	 we	 should	 have	 the	
shadow	 banking	 system	 on	 the	 radar	 and	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 deposit	
substitutes	it	creates	and	how	they	are	regulated.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 paper	 point	 to	 a	 more	 general	
phenomenon	 that	 deserves	 to	 be	 put	 on	 the	 research	 agenda	 in	 IPE:	 the	
‘accommodation’	of	private	credit	money	forms	in	the	public	money	supply	as	a	
recurrent	 political-economic	 process.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 the	 history	 of	 Western	
political	economies,	we	see	that	the	main	financial	instruments	which	we	utilize	
and	consider	as	public	money	today	used	to	be	private	credit	money	in	the	past.	
This	 is	 particularly	 true	 for	 bank	notes	 and	bank	deposits,	which—in	 terms	of	
Pozsar‘s	Money	Matrix—were	public-private	money	or	pure	private	money	in	the	
18th	 and	 19th	 century,	 respectively.	 From	 today’s	 perspective,	 we	 might	 thus	
insinuate	that	both	bank	notes	and	bank	deposits	were	the	‘shadow	money’	of	a	
previous	 epoch.	 Today,	 we	 almost	 naturally	 consider	 them	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	
public	money	supply.	Bank	notes—following	Pozsar’s	taxonomy—are	pure	public	
money,	which	can	be	 issued	by	central	banks	at	 their	discretion.	Bank	deposits	
are	private-public	money,	which	is	protected	by	an	elaborate	framework	of	public	
backstops,	 in	 particular	 the	 discount	 window	 at	 the	 central	 bank	 protecting	
against	 illiquidity	 as	 well	 as	 public	 deposit	 insurance	 protecting	 against	
insolvency.	 Improving	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
determinants	of	this	process	of	 ‘private	credit	money	accommodation’	will	help	
us	better	establish	the	connections	of	shadow	banking	and	the	monetary	system,	
and	 it	 reinforces	 the	 argument	 that	 if	 we	 want	 to	 become	 aware	 of	 the	
evolutionary	trajectory	of	 the	monetary	system,	we	should	pay	attention	to	the	
status	of	shadow	money	instruments	within	the	hybridity	of	public	and	private	
credit	money.	 	
	 23	
References	
	
Acharya,	Viral	V.	and	Schnabl,	Philipp	(2010)	'Do	Global	Banks	Spread	Global	
Imbalances?	Asset-Backed	Commercial	Paper	during	the	Financial	Crisis	of	
2007-09',	IMF	Economic	Review	58	(1),	pp.	37-73.	
Acharya,	Viral	V.,	Schnabl,	Philipp,	and	Suarez,	Gustavo	A.	(2010)	Securitization	
without	Risk	Transfer,	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	Working	Paper	
15730.	
Adrian,	Tobias	(2014)	Financial	Stability	Policies	for	Shadow	Banking,	Federal	
Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	Staff	Report	No.	664.	
Adrian,	Tobias,	Burke,	Christopher	R.,	and	McAndrews,	James	J.	(2009)	'The	
Federal	Reserve's	Primary	Dealer	Credit	Facility',	Current	Issues	in	Economics	
and	Finance	15	(4),	pp.	1-12.	
Anderson,	Richard	G.	and	Gascon,	Charles	S.	(2009)	'The	Commercial	Paper	
Market,	the	Fed,	and	the	2007-2009	Financial	Crisis',	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	
St.	Louis	Review	91	(6),	pp.	589-612.	
Armantier,	Olivier,	Krieger,	Sandra,	and	McAndrews,	James	J.	(2008)	'The	Federal	
Reserve's	Term	Auction	Facility',	Current	Issues	in	Economics	and	Finance	14	
(5),	pp.	1-11.	
Baklanova,	Viktoria	(2012)	Money	Market	Funds	in	the	US	and	the	EU.	A	Legal	and	
Comparative	Analysis,	University	of	Westminster,	School	of	Law,	PhD	thesis.	
Ban,	Cornel,	Seabrooke,	Leonard,	and	Freitas,	Sarah	(2016)	'Grey	Matter	in	
Shadow	Banking.	International	Organizations	and	Expert	Strategies	in	Global	
Financial	Governance',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	23	(6),	pp.	
1001-1033.	
Bernanke,	Ben	(2013)	The	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Financial	Crisis,	Princeton:	
Princeton	University	Press.	
Bernanke,	Ben	(2015)	The	Courage	to	Act.	A	Memoir	of	a	Crisis	and	Its	Aftermath,	
New	York:	WWNorton.	
Blyth,	Mark	(2002)	Great	Transformations.	Economic	Ideas	and	Institutional	
Change	in	the	Twentieth	Century,	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Boesler,	Matthew	and	Condon,	Christopher	(2015)	‘Fed	Removes	Reverse	Repo	
Cap	to	Ensure	Control	Over	Rates’,	Bloomberg,	16	December	2015	
Braun,	Benjamin	(2013)	'Preparedness,	Crisis	Management	and	Policy	Change.	
The	Euro	Area	at	the	Critical	Juncture	of	2008-2013',	The	British	Journal	of	
Politics	and	International	Relations	17	(3),	pp.	419-441.	
Brunnermeier,	Markus	K.	(2009)	'Deciphering	the	Liquidity	and	Credit	Crunch	
2007-2008',	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	23	(1),	pp.	77-100.	
Bryan,	Dick,	Rafferty,	Michael,	and	Wigan,	Duncan	(2016)	'Politics,	Time	and	
Space	in	the	Era	of	Shadow	Banking',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	
23	(6),	pp.	941-966.	
Cecchetti,	Stephen	G.	(2008)	Crisis	and	Responses.	The	Federal	Reserve	and	the	
Financial	Crisis	of	2007-2008,	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	Working	
Paper	14134.	
Chen,	Jiakai	(2015)	Off-Balance	Sheet	Financing	and	Bank	Capital	Regulation.	
Lessons	from	Asset-Backed	Commercial	Paper,	Haas	School	of	Business,	UC	
Berkeley,	Job	Market	Paper.	
Claessens,	Stijn	et	al.	(2012)	Shadow	Banking.	Economics	and	Policy,	International	
Monetary	Fund,	IMF	Staff	Discussion	Paper	SDN/12/12.	
	 24	
Cohen,	Benjamin	J.	and	Benney,	Tabitha	(2014)	'What	Does	the	International	
Currency	System	Really	Look	Like?',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	
21	(5),	pp.	1017-1041.	
Copeland,	Adam	et	al.	(2011)	Policy	Issues	in	the	Design	of	Tri-Party	Repo	Markets,	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	Unpublished	Manuscript.	
Copeland,	Adam	et	al.	(2012)	Key	Mechanics	of	the	U.S.	Tri-Party	Repo	Market,	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	FRBNY	Economic	Policy	Review.	
Covitz,	Daniel	M.,	Liang,	Nellie,	and	Suarez,	Gustavo	A.	(2009)	The	Evolution	of	a	
Financial	Crisis.	Panic	in	the	Asset-Backed	Commercial	Paper	Market,	Federal	
Reserve	Board,	Finance	and	Economics	Discussion	Series	2009-36.	
Duffie,	Darrell	(2016)	Financial	Regulatory	Reform	After	the	Crisis,	European	
Central	Bank,	Paper	for	the	ECB	Forum	on	Central	Banking	in	Sintra,	Portugal.	
Ellis,	David	and	Rooney,	Ben	(2007)	'Banks	to	Abandon	'Super-SIV	Fund',	
CNNMoney,	21	December	2007.		
Ennis,	Huberto	M.	(2011)	'Strategic	Behavior	in	the	Tri-Party	Repo	Market',	
Economic	Quarterly	97	(4),	pp.	389-413.	
Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation	(2008)	Press	Release.	October	7,	2008,	
Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation,	Press	Release.	
Federal	Open	Market	Committee	(2008)	Minutes	of	the	Federal	Open	Market	
Committee.	October	28-29,	2008,	Federal	Reserve,	Minutes.	
Federal	Reserve	(2007)	Press	Release.	December	12,	2007,	Board	of	Governors	of	
the	Federal	Reserve	System.	
Federal	Reserve	(2010)	Press	Release.	January	27,	2010,	Board	of	Governors	of	
the	Federal	Reserve	System.	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York	(2008)	Term	Asset-Backed	Securities	Loan	
Facility	(TALF)	Terms	and	Conditions,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	Fact	
Sheet.	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York	(2009a)	Commercial	Paper	Funding	Facility.	
Frequently	Asked	Questions,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	FAQ	Website.	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York	(2009b)	Money	Market	Investor	Funding	
Facility.	Frequently	Asked	Questions,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	FAQ	
Website.	
Financial	Stability	Board	(2011)	Shadow	Banking.	Strengthening	Oversight	and	
Regulation,	Financial	Stability	Board,	Recommendations.	
Fink,	Matthew	P.	(2011)	The	Rise	of	Mutual	Funds.	An	Insider	View,	Oxford	and	
New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Fioretos,	Orfeo	(2010)	'Capitalist	Diversity	and	the	International	Regulation	of	
Hedge	Funds',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	17	(4),	pp.	696-723.	
Fleming,	Michael	J.,	Hrung,	Warren	B.,	and	Keane,	Frank	M.	(2009)	'The	Term	
Securities	Lending	Facility.	Origin,	Design,	and	Effects',	Current	Issues	in	
Economics	and	Finance	15	(2),	pp.	1-11.	
Frost,	Joshua	et	al.	(2015)	Overnight	RRP	Operations	as	a	Monetary	Policy	Tool.	
Some	Design	Considerations,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	Staff	Report	
No.	712.	
Gabor,	Daniela	(2016)	'The	(Impossible)	Repo	Trinity.	The	Political	Economy	of	
Repo	Markets',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	23	(6),	pp.	967-1000.	
Gabor,	Daniela	and	Ban,	Cornel	(2016)	'Banking	on	Bonds.	The	New	Links	
Between	States	and	Markets',	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies	54	(3),	pp.	
617-635.		
	 25	
Gabor,	Daniela	and	Vestergaard,	Jakob	(2016)	Towards	a	Theory	of	Shadow	
Money,	Institute	for	New	Economic	Thinking,	INET	Working	Paper.	
Garbade,	Kenneth	D.	(2006)	'The	Evolution	of	Repo	Contracting	Conventions	in	
the	1980s',	Economic	Policy	Review	12	(1),	pp.	27-42.		
Geithner,	Timothy	F.	(2014)	Stress	Test.	Reflections	on	Financial	Crises,	New	York:	
Broadway	Books.	
Gorton,	Gary	B.	(2010)	Slapped	by	the	Invisible	Hand.	The	Panic	of	2007,	Oxford	
and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Gorton,	Gary	B.	and	Metrick,	Andrew	(2012)	'Securitized	Banking	and	the	Run	on	
Repo',	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	104	(3),	pp.	425-451.	
Helleiner,	Eric	(2008)	'Political	Determinants	of	International	Currencies.	What	
Future	for	the	US	Dollar?',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	15	(3),	pp.	
354-378.	
Helgadóttir,	Oddny	(2016)	'Banking	Upside	Down.	The	Implicit	Politics	of	
Shadow	Banking	Expertise',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	23	(6),	
pp.	915-940.	
ICI	(2014)	2014	Investment	Company	Fact	Book.	A	Review	of	Trends	and	Activities	
in	the	U.S.	Investment	Company	Industry,	Investment	Company	Institute.	
Ingham,	Geoffrey	(2004)	The	Nature	of	Money,	Cambridge	and	Malden:	Polity	
Press.	
Jackson,	Patricia	(2013)	'Shadow	Banking	and	New	Lending	Channels	-	Past	and	
Future',	in:	Morten	Balling	and	Ernest	Gnan	(ed.)	50	Years	of	Money	and	
Finance.	Lessons	and	Challenges,	Vienna:	SUERF	-	The	European	Money	and	
Finance	Forum,	pp.	377-414.	
Jakab,	Zoltan	and	Kumhof,	Michael	(2015)	Banks	are	not	Intermediaries	of	
Loanable	Funds	-	And	Why	This	Matters,	Bank	of	England,	Working	Paper	No.	
529.	
Jones,	Phillipa	(1997)	'The	Fight	for	Tri-Party	Repo',	iCB	13	(4),	pp.	28-33.	
Lynch,	Sarah	N.	(2013)	'SEC	Moves	to	Tighten	Regulations	on	Money	Market	
Funds',	Reuters,	5	June	2013.	
Lysandrou,	Photis	and	Nesvetailova,	Anastasia	(2015)	'The	Role	of	Shadow	
Banking	Entities	in	the	Financial	Crisis.	A	Disaggregated	View',	Review	of	
International	Political	Economy	22	(2),	pp.	257-279.	
MacDonald,	Ronald	(1996)	Deposit	Insurance,	Centre	for	Central	Banking	Studies,	
Bank	of	England,	Handbooks	in	Central	Banking	No.	9.	
McCabe,	Patrick	E.	(2015)	'Money	Market	Funds.	Reconsidering	the	Mutual	Fund	
Model',	in:	Stijn	Claessens	et	al.	(ed.)	Shadow	Banking	within	and	Across	
National	Borders,	Singapore:	World	Scientific	Publishing,	pp.	301-322.	
McCulley,	Paul	(2009)	'The	Shadow	Banking	System	and	Hyman	Minsky's	
Economic	Journey',	PIMCO.	Global	Central	Bank	Focus.	
McCulley,	Paul	and	Pozsar,	Zoltan	(2014)	'Make	Shadow	Banks	Safe	and	Private	
Money	Sound',	Financial	Times,	16	June	2014.	
McLeay,	Michael,	Radia,	Amar,	and	Thomas,	Ryland	(2014)	Money	in	the	Modern	
Economy.	An	Introduction,	Bank	of	England,	Quarterly	Bulletin	2014	Q1.	
McMillan,	Jonathan	(2014)	The	End	of	Banking.	Money,	Credit,	and	the	Digital	
Revolution,	Zero/One	Economics	GmbH.	
Mehrling,	Perry	(2011)	The	New	Lombard	Street.	How	the	Fed	Became	the	Dealer	
of	Last	Resort,	Princeton	and	Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press.	
Mehrling,	Perry	(2013a)	'Financial	Globalization	and	the	Future	of	the	Fed',	in:	
	 26	
Toshiaki	Hirai,	Maria	Cristina	Marcuzzo,	and	Perry	Mehrling	(ed.)	Keynesian	
Reflections.	Effective	Demand,	Money,	Finance,	and	Policies	in	the	Crisis,	Oxford	
University	Press,		
Mehrling,	Perry	(2013b)	'Insights	from	Walter	Bagehot',	in:	G.	Page	West	III	and	
Robert	M.	Whaples	(ed.)	The	Economic	Crisis	in	Retrospect.	Explanations	by	
Great	Economists,	Cheltenham	and	Northampton:	Edward	Elgar,	pp.	13-42.	
Mehrling,	Perry	(2015a)	Why	Is	Money	Difficult?,	Barnard	College	of	Columbia	
University,	Blog.	
Mehrling,	Perry	(2015b)	‘Elasticity	and	Discipline	in	the	Global	Swap	Network’,	
International	Journal	of	Political	Economy	44(4),	pp.	311-324.	
Mehrling,	Perry	et	al.	(2013)	Bagehot	was	a	Shadow	Banker.	Shadow	Banking,	
Central	Banking,	and	the	Future	of	Global	Finance,	Institute	for	New	Economic	
Thinking,	Shadow	Banking	Colloquium.	
Minsky,	Hyman	P.	(1986)	Stabilizing	an	Unstable	Economy,	New	Haven	and	
London:	Yale	University	Press.	
Mitchell-Innes,	Alfred	(1914)	'The	Credit	Theory	of	Money',	The	Banking	Law	
Journal	31	pp.	151-168.	
Moe,	Thorvald	Grung	(2012)	Shadow	Banking	and	the	Limits	of	Central	Bank	
Liquidity	Support.	How	to	Achieve	a	Better	Balance	between	Global	and	Official	
Liquidity,	Levy	Economics	Institute,	Working	Paper	WP	No.	712.	
Moe,	Thorvald	Grung	(2014)	Shadow	Banking.	Policy	Challenges	for	Central	
Banks,	Levy	Economics	Institute,	Working	Paper	No.	802.	
Moreira,	Alan	and	Savov,	Alexi	(2014)	The	Macroeconomics	of	Shadow	Banking,	
National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research,	Working	Paper.	
Nesvetailova,	Anastasia	(2015)	'A	Crisis	of	the	Overcrowded	Future.	Shadow	
Banking	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Financial	Innovation',	New	Political	
Economy	20	(3),	pp.	431-453.	
Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	(2010)	Risk-Based	Capital	Guidelines.	
Final	Rule,	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury.	
Pagliari,	Stefano	and	Young,	Kevin	L.	(2014)	'Leveraged	Interests.	Financial	
Industry	Power	and	the	Role	of	Private	Sector	Coalitions',	Review	of	
International	Political	Economy	21	(3),	pp.	575-610.	
Paulson,	Henry	M.,	Jr.	(2010)	On	the	Brink.	Inside	the	Race	to	Stop	the	Collapse	of	
the	Global	Financial	System,	New	York:	Business	Plus.	
Porter,	Tony	(2003)	'Technical	Collaboration	and	Political	Conflict	in	the	
Emerging	Regime	for	International	Financial	Regulation',	Review	of	
International	Political	Economy	10	(3),	pp.	520-551.	
Pozsar,	Zoltan	(2011)	Institutional	Cash	Pools	and	the	Triffin	Dilemma	of	the	U.S.	
Banking	System,	International	Monetary	Fund,	IMF	Working	Paper	
WP/11/190.	
Pozsar,	Zoltan	(2014)	Shadow	Banking.	The	Money	View,	Office	of	Financial	
Research,	Working	Paper.	
Pozsar,	Zoltan	(2015)	A	Macro	View	of	Shadow	Banking.	Levered	Betas	and	
Wholesale	Funding	in	the	Context	of	Secular	Stagnation,	.	
Pozsar,	Zoltan	et	al.	(2012)	Shadow	Banking,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	
Staff	Report	458.	
Pozsar,	Zoltan	and	Sweeney,	James	(2015)	The	Money	Market	Under	Government	
Control,	Credit	Suisse,	Global	Money	Notes	#1.	
Ricks,	Morgan	(2011)	'Regulating	Money	Creation	after	the	Crisis',	Harvard	
	 27	
Business	Law	Review	1	pp.	75-143.	
Ricks,	Morgan	(2012)	'Money	and	(Shadow)	Banking.	A	Thought	Experiment',	
Review	of	Banking	and	Financial	Law	31	pp.	731-748.	
Ricks,	Morgan	(2016)	The	Money	Problem.	Rethinking	Financial	Regulation,	
Chicago	and	London:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press.	
Schumpeter,	Joseph	Alois	(1954)	[2006]	History	of	Economic	Analysis,	New	York:	
Oxford	University	Press.	
Schwartz,	Herman	M.	(2009)	Subprime	Nation.	American	Power,	Global	Capital,	
and	the	Housing	Bubble,	Ithaca	and	London:	Cornell	University	Press.	
SEC	(2010)	Money	Market	Fund	Reform.	Final	Rule,	Securities	and	Exchange	
Commission.	
SEC	(2014)	Money	Market	Fund	Reform.	Amendments	to	Form	PF,	Securities	and	
Exchange	Commission,	Final	Rule.	
Sennholz-Weinhardt,	Barbara	(2014)	'Regulatory	Competition	as	a	Social	Fact.	
Constructing	and	Contesting	the	Threat	of	Hedge	Fund	Managers'	Relocation	
from	Britain',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	21	(6),	pp.	2140-2174.	
SIFMA	(2015)	Money	Market	Reform	Resource	Center,	Securities	Industry	and	
Financial	Markets	Association.	
Sissoko,	Carolyn	(2010)	'The	Legal	Foundations	of	Financial	Collapse',	Journal	of	
Financial	Economic	Policy	2	(1),	pp.	5-34.	
Sunderam,	Adi	(2012)	Money	Creation	in	the	Shadow	Banking	System,	Harvard	
Business	School,	Working	Paper.	
Strange,	Susan	(1996)	The	Retreat	of	the	State.	The	Diffusion	of	Power	in	the	
World	Economy,	Cambridge	and	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Thiemann,	Matthias	(2014)	'In	the	Shadow	of	Basel.	How	Competitive	Politics	
Bred	the	Crisis',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	21	(6),	pp.	1203-
1239.	
Tsingou,	Eleni	(2015)	'Club	Governance	and	the	Making	of	Global	Financial	
Rules',	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	22	(2),	pp.	225-256.	
Turner,	Adair	(2012)	Shadow	Banking	and	Financial	Instability,	UK	Financial	
Services	Authority,	Speech	at	Cass	Business	School,	14	March	2012.	
U.S.	Treasury	(2008)	Treasury	Announces	Guaranty	Program	for	Money	Market	
Funds,	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury,	Press	Report.	
U.S.	Treasury	(2009)	Treasury	Announces	Expiration	of	Guarantee	Program	for	
Money	Market	Funds	(19	September	2009),	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury,	
Press	Report.	
Werner,	Richard	A.	(2015)	'A	Lost	Century	in	Economics.	Three	Theories	of	
Banking	and	the	Conclusive	Evidence',	International	Review	of	Financial	
Analysis,	doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2015.08.014.	
Widmaier,	Wesley	W.	(2016)	Economic	Ideas	in	Political	Time.	The	Construction,	
Conversion	and	Crisis	of	Economic	Orders	from	the	Progressive	Era	to	the	Global	
Financial	Crisis,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
	 	
	 28	
Interviews	
	
Interview	1:	Interview	with	an	official	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	
5	June	2015,	New	York.	
Interview	2:	Interview	with	a	research	officer	at	the	Federal	Reseve	Bank	of	New	
York,	5	June	2015,	New	York.	
Interview	3:	Interview	with	an	official	at	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	8	June	
2015,	Washington	D.C.	
Interview	4:	Interview	with	an	official	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board,	8	June	2015,	
Washington	D.C.	
Interview	5:	Interview	with	a	former	member	of	staff	at	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Treasury,	24	July	2015,	New	York	.	
Interview	6:	Interview	with	an	official	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	York,	
24	July	2015,	New	York.	
Interview	7:	Interview	with	a	former	member	of	staff	at	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Treasury,	20	August	2015,	online	interview.	
	
	
	
																																																								
1	 Other	 terms	 for	 SPVs	 that	 are	 legally	 different	 but	 functionally	 equivalent	 are	 ‘Structured	
Purpose	Vehicles’,	‘Special	Investment	Vehicles’,	‘ABCP	conduits’	or	‘ABCP	programmes’.	
2	 The	description	of	the	empirical	Money	Matrix	rests	upon	the	categorization	of	Pozsar	(2014)	
but	 adds	ABCPs	 to	 the	 picture	 and	 leaves	 out	 Treasury	 liabilities	whose	 property	 as	 credit	
money	 is	 contested	 (see	 Ricks	 2016	 as	well	 as	 Gabor	 and	 Vestergaard	 2016	 for	 a	 detailed	
discussion	of	contemporary	credit	money	forms	and	hierarchies).	
3	 After	 Lehman’s	 collapse,	 public	 authorities	 adopted	measures	 to	 support	 the	 securitisation	
channel	of	shadow	banking.	Those	involved	emergency	liquidity	facilities	such	as	the	Money	
Market	Investor	Funding	Facility	(MMIFF),	the	Commercial	Paper	Funding	Facility	(CPFF)	and	
the	 Term	 Asset-Backed	 Securities	 Loan	 Facility	 (TALF)	 (see	 e.g.	 FOMC	 2008,	 FRNBY	 2008,	
FRBNY	 2009a,	 FRNBY	 2009b).	 However,	 those	 facilities	 did	 not	 primarily	 affect	 the	 ABCP	
market	as	ABCPs	had	already	lost	their	relevance	at	that	point	(Mehrling	2011).	
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Figure	1—Shadow	money	creation	in	the	stylized	shadow	banking	system	
	 Assets	 Liabilities	
	
Commercial	Banks	
	
Loans	and	bonds	
(long-term	IOUs)	
	
Deposits	
(very	short-term	IOUs)	
	
SPVs	 ABSs	
(long-term	IOUs)	
	
ABCPs	
(short-term	IOUs)	
Securities	Dealers:	 Term	repos	
(long-term	IOUs)	
	
Overnight	repos	
(short-term	IOUs)	
MMFs	 ABCPs	and	overnight	repos	
(short-term	IOUs)	
MMF	shares	
(very	short-term	IOUs)	
	
	
Figure	2—Traditional	and	Shadow	Money,	created	as	a	swap	of	IOUs	
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Figure	3—The	‘Money	Matrix’	(conceptually)	 	
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Figure	4—The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	before	the	2007-9	Crisis)	
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Figure	5—The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	in	the	year	after	Lehman)	 	
	
	
Figure	6—Impact	of	the	Public	Intervention	on	the	ABCP	market	 	
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Figure	7—Impact	of	the	Public	Intervention	on	the	Tri-Party	Repo	Market	 	
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Figure	8	–	Impact	of	the	Public	Intervention	on	the	MMF	Market	
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Figure	9	–	The	‘Money	Matrix’	(empirically,	since	2014)	
	 	
	
	
	
	
Figure	10—Implicit	backstops	for	Government	MMF	shares	
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Figure	11—Implicit	backstops	for	overnight	repos	and	RRP	
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